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1
INTRODUCTION
“Colonialism and colonial rule, be it that of Germany, Great Britain,… or any other colonising
power, was fundamentally cruel, unjust, and disrespectful of fundamental human rights.”1

This statement serves as part of the introduction to the 2003 annotated reprint of the
British Blue Book of 1918, a document that sparked heated debate between Britain and Germany
regarding both nations’ colonial practices, particularly in Africa. When viewed in general terms,
it is difficult to refute this statement. European colonial powers consistently sought to exploit the
people, land, and natural resources of their possessions. Indeed, a chief aim in garnering colonial
acquisitions was the aggrandizement of the home county’s wealth and prestige. But were there
instances in which these fundamental aspects of colonial rule were challenged at home? Were
domestic public and political forces ever able to effect change that served to mediate, at least to
some degree, the cruelty, injustice, and denial of rights? If so, what specific elements needed to
be present for such changes to occur? This account investigates these questions through the
comparison of two specific instances of colonial conflict in southern Africa: the Anglo-Boer War
in South Africa and the series of conflicts commonly referred to as the Herero Wars in German
Southwest Africa.
These conflicts represent two marked instances of colonial wartime policy that led to
extensive noncombatant suffering and death during the height of European colonialism in Africa.
They represented some of the first deployments of concentration camps (a loaded term that will
be contextualized as it relates to each of these two situations) against enemy populations. In the
case of South Africa, administrative policy shifts eventually occurred and significantly improved
conditions for noncombatants. Changes in policy also occurred in Southwest Africa; however,
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they ultimately did little to improve the quality of life for the enemies of the German colonial
administration.
Studies on the conditions for noncombatants during the Anglo-Boer War were not
seriously undertaken until the late twentieth century. S.B. Spies’ Methods of Barbarism?:
Roberts and Kitchener and Civilians in the Boer Republics (1977) was the first detailed account
of tactics employed toward noncombatants by the British colonial administration. Several years
later, Thomas Pakenham’s The Boer War (1979) presented evidence of the mortality in the
camps as part of a groundbreaking, comprehensive account that drew on voluminous primary
sources in order to critically investigate the origins of the war and its consequences. Works
focused on civilians became far more diverse as the centenary of the Anglo-Boer conflict
approached. Brian Roberts’ Those Bloody Women: Three Heroines of the Boer War (1991)
focused solely on influential female figures. Collections of essays and articles were also
published, dealing with myriad issues such as disease, the role of the press, and public activism. 2
The most recent scholarship comes from Elizabeth van Heyningen, who drew on extensive
primary source material

(including camp

reports, administrative and governmental

correspondence, and camp registers) to develop the first in-depth social history of the Boer
concentration camps.3
The conduct of German colonialism in Southwest Africa, similarly, did not receive
significant academic exposure for some time, and the first significant treatment was Horst
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Drechsler’s S

stafri a unt r

utsch r

olonialh rrschaft in 1966.4 Drechsler presented a

charged critique of German tactics, focusing heavily on civilian mortality as a direct result of
exterminatory military actions. Helmut Bley’s South-West Africa Under German Rule (1971)
echoed Drechsler’s contentions, and extended the argument by addressing the role of social and
administrative issues in sparking conflict. The centenary of the Herero Wars also inspired new
scholarship. Historians comprehensively addressed the effects of German colonialism on Herero
society and the interplay between colonial officials in the German government.5 In 2008, the
collection Genocide in German Southwest Africa: The Colonial War of 1904-1908 and its
Aftermath included essays on a wide range of topics, including the concentration camps, gender,
and contemporary German literature. The same year, Casper W. Erichsen published a
comprehensive account of the concentration camps in, and it contains one of the most detailed
descriptions of the massive concentration camp at Shark Island to date.6
This thesis maintains that the propensity for meaningful shifts in the treatment of
noncombatants depended greatly on the nature of the victims (i.e., whites of European descent,
as opposed to native Africans) and the prevailing viewpoints on their roles in the respective
colonial societies; moreover, that policy change was dictated mainly by differences in the
presence, character, and effect of opposition in the public and political spheres and the structure
of the administration within the colony carrying out the policy. It comparatively examines the
phases of these respective conflicts in a roughly chronological fashion. Section I addresses the
origins of the colonial presence in both regions, as well as the specific events that led to war.
4
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Section II deals with the development of military tactics aimed at noncombatants. Section III
summarizes the public and political forces that supported and opposed these methods, focusing
heavily on the varying levels of influence opposition voices were able to achieve in each
situation. Section IV analyzes the quality of life for noncombatants in the late war and postwar
environments of the two colonial possessions. In each section, developments in South Africa and
Southwest Africa are each addressed individually, followed by comparative analyses and
conclusions.
Each section draws on sources that effectively represent its particular focus, for example,
the public exposure of enemy civilians’ living conditions and political debate about wartime
conduct. Information regarding civilian conditions is drawn from those who directly observed
them. This includes the original text of independent and government-commissioned reports and
detailed representations of observer accounts in secondary sources. Articles in The Times that
represent both domestic and foreign opposition to British tactics, as well as the responses of
Times correspondents that defended British wartime conduct, are employed to analyze the extent
to which critical voices were available for public consumption in Britain. A significant aspect of
this study is the presence and results of the political debate surrounding civilian-focused tactics,
and the records of British Parliament, as well as secondary sources detailing the positions of
parties in the Reichstag, are used to address these developments.

5
SECTION I: COLONIZATION LEADS TO CONFLICT
South Africa: A Long-Standing Presence
Britain’s colonial status in southern Africa at the turn of the twentieth century was well
established. Britain’s possession of the Cape Colony in southern Africa dated back to 1806.
Unlike the Herero and other tribes of Southwest Africa, the Boers were not indigenous
inhabitants of South Africa, but their presence on the continent had deep roots. White settlers,
who dubbed themselves “Afrikaners,” first came to South Africa after the Dutch East India
Company established a shipping station at the Cape of Good Hope in 1652. The trekboers
(Boers) were the poorest group of these Dutch emigrants. They were nomadic farmers, and their
constant search for fresh grazing lands brought them ever further into the African interior. The
independent, republican Boers of the frontier were a particular source of resistance to British
rule. Britain’s efforts to reform the treatment of native Africans were a major source of
opposition to colonial rule among the frontier Boers. A major point of contention arose in 1833,
when Britain abolished the practice of slavery throughout its empire. The frontier Boers
(voortrekkers, pioneers) began the Great Trek in 1835. This mass emigration led to a large
population of Boers outside the Cape Colony, taking them beyond its northeast borders.7
British treatment of Boer sovereignty was inconsistent, but in 1852 and 1854 the British
officially recognized two new independent Boer republics, the Transvaal and the Orange Free
State. However, in 1877, the British annexed the Transvaal and the First Boer War began. The
Boers emerged triumphant and the republic passed back into Boer hands. In 1886, the discovery
of gold inexorably changed the political landscape in South Africa. Predominantly British
settlers, known as uitlanders, pushed into the Transvaal, swept up in the gold rush. The Boers
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continued their refusal to allow British influence and committed to limiting the political rights of
the uitlanders. Boer State Attorney Jan Smuts stated that any change in British policy that
“intended to substitute for local self-government in South Africa an increased exercise of
imperial authority… is bound to miscarry fatally.”8 The influx of uitlanders was so massive that
they outnumbered the Boers in the Transvaal nearly two to one in 1898, and granting voting
rights would have led to the loss of Boer political control in the region.9
The desire for control of the gold was certainly a motivation for British actions, but the
issue of voting rights proved to be the spark that set off the Second Boer War. 10 In 1899,
Colonial Secretary Joseph Chamberlain demanded political rights for the uitlanders. Paul Kruger,
President of the South African Republic, responded with an ultimatum: the British were to
remove their border troops within forty-eight hours or he would declare war. On October 11,
hostilities commenced. The longstanding presence of the Boer people in South Africa meant that
although they were not indigenous to the region, they maintained a strong connection to the land
they worked and farmed. It is not surprising that they replied so strongly to measures they
conceived to threaten their national sovereignty.
Southwest Africa: A Colonial Newcomer
Germany’s status in the push for African colonial possessions by European nations was
unique in that it was a late arrival to the situation. This infused the country’s subsequent efforts
in Southwest Africa with a sense of urgency, creating an atmosphere in which excessively harsh
measures became commonplace.11 These measures were deemed necessary in order to establish
firm control as rapidly as possible. Swift subjugation of the native people was of great
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importance because of Germany’s overarching goals in Southwest Africa. First and foremost,
Germany sought this colonial possession for settlement. Whether it was a pragmatic measure to
provide additional land for Germany’s rapidly growing population or a more esoteric mission to
create a “New Germany” in Africa and increase the nation’s prestige, especially in comparison to
other European countries, the ultimate aim was to settle a significant German population in the
region.12
The brutal excesses of Germany’s later rule in Southwest Africa were largely (although
not wholly) absent during the governorship of Theodor Leutwein, which lasted from 1894 to
1904. Leutwein had joined the Prussian Army in 1868 and was promoted to the rank of major
shortly before he departed for Africa. Unlike his predecessor (Reichskommisar Curt von
François), Leutwein engaged in concerted attempts to establish relations with Southwest Africa’s
indigenous tribes. His strategy in dealing with the native population focused heavily on
diplomacy and the establishment of so-called protection treaties with chiefs of the major tribes in
the region. He sought to divide and conquer by establishing accords with those he believed were
able to exert the most influence. These agreements served the dual purpose of legitimizing
Germany’s presence in Southwest Africa and paving the way for settlement.13 While Leutwein’s
strategies emphasized conciliation, they always contained overtones of German military
superiority. Additionally, an epidemic of rinderpest, which began in 1897, decimated the
region’s cattle population, effectively destroying the economic livelihood of the Herero. Many
Herero were forced to sell major portions of their land holdings simply to support themselves.
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After these developments, much of the veneer Leutwein had created through his deft negotiations
was stripped away, and the Herero became much more cognizant of their subservient position.14
Leutwein’s supposedly conciliatory policies were unpopular with German settlers. An
atmosphere of superiority developed, fostered by the growth of European-style towns. In the
major German city center of Windhoek, the limited native presence provided “no opportunities
for the dogmatic ideas of the settlers… to be tempered by the practical experience of the
Africans,” and dictated that “[m]any of them [i.e., German settlers] could not even distinguish
between the ruling class of the Herero and the ordinary members of the tribe, although,… it was
on this distinction that Leutwein’s entire policy was based.”15 Settlers saw Leutwein’s
willingness to negotiate as an indication that the native population was on an equal plane. The
desire to establish dominance permeated the settler mentality and led to strained relations with
the native tribes.16 This tension was further increased by a 1903 regulation that established a
limitation on debts, known as the German Credit Ordinance. Although ostensibly intended to
relieve pressure on indebted Herero, the ordinance spurred a major push by traders to collect
outstanding debts. Their forceful seizure of land and cattle deprived the Herero of their
traditional means of subsistence. Social and economic pressure grew steadily in German
Southwest Africa at the turn of the twentieth century, and by 1904, the Herero leadership
recognized their people’s position of powerlessness.17 When the bulk of German troops in the
area were sent south to deal with unrest involving a smaller tribe, the Bondelswarts, the Herero
revolted.
14
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Comparisons
At the most basic level, conflict in both cases revolved around the issue of basic rights;
essentially, the perception by the Herero and the Boers that they had lost, or were soon to lose,
their voice in running their own affairs. The heavy-handed pursuit and imposition of measures
that sought to increase colonial dominance caused a backlash in both situations. In the case of
South Africa, the British measures that sparked conflict grew out of a confluence of political and
economic concerns. The demands for political rights for the uitlanders spoke to the British desire
to protect their interests in exploiting the raw materials of the Transvaal. This also entailed
securing British control of land holdings that contained these resources, culminating in measures
that sought to protect and extend the economic gains of the uitlanders. In contrast, the German
colonial apparatus in Southwest Africa sought to exploit everything as rapidly as possible. The
economic success of German Southwest Africa as a colony was utterly dependent on the ability
to secure control of land and cattle. The dispossession of the Herero and other native tribes was
integral to the future of the colony. Effectively securing arable land and healthy stock was
necessary in order to entice Germans to emigrate and establish the colony’s place in the German
Empire.18
Leutwein initially attempted to secure such control through policies that emphasized
negotiation with Africans while preserving certain aspects of the native infrastructure. While he
surely used Germany’s military superiority to buttress his stance and bend tribal leaders to his
will, he proceeded from a position that allowed the chiefs of the major tribes – particularly
Samuel Maherero of the Herero and Hendrik Witbooi of the Nama, the second largest tribe in the
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region – to believe that their pleas would be taken under consideration.19 The German settlers’
growing distaste with Theodor Leutwein’s policies emerged as an indication that the majority
viewed the Herero as deserving only of complete subjugation. They “attacked the government’s
‘false sentimentality towards uncivilised natives’ and demanded that the Africans’ land and cattle
should pass immediately into European hands.”20 As early as 1902, the Deutsche
Kolonialgesellschaft, considered to be the voice of the settlers in Germany, stated:
There is certainly no other government in Africa… which spoils the natives more than
ours does… A colonial government which only marginally realizes what it is there
for…must have the aim to expropriate the natives of part of their land in order to create
farm land for farmers: it must also curtail the freedom of the natives to a large extent in
order to ensure sufficient native labour, without which the white settler and farmer will
be lost.21
The increased presence of new settlers completely unfamiliar with African tribal culture and
society led to behavior that amplified social tensions and degraded relations to the point that the
Herero felt compelled to revolt. The actions of the settlers were a key contributing factor in
radicalizing the official German position. Conceptions of German superiority by the settlers in
Southwest Africa led them to take a position that tolerated far less resistance than the uitlanders
in the Transvaal.22 Even when the British uitlanders became vehement in their demands, they
initially sought to engineer a solution through political maneuvering in order to secure their place
inside the existing Boer structure, not to tear it down.23 In contrast, the actions and attitudes of
German settlers during the prewar period were echoed in the methods adopted following the
revolt. Despite the efforts of those like Leutwein, who sought to preserve some semblance of
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good relations between Germany and the Herero, the view that the colony would need to be
“cleared” to achieve German aims became increasingly prevalent.24
In the Transvaal, the British demanded political rights for their settlers that would put
them on a just footing with the Boers in the region, suggesting a general feeling of equality
between Briton and Boer. Although British interests certainly sought to exploit the natural wealth
of the region, they did not assume an inflexible attitude of racial superiority. As early as 1896,
Secretary of State for the Colonies Joseph Chamberlain stated that a
war in South Africa would be one of the most serious wars that could possibly be waged.
It would be in the nature of a Civil War. It would be a long war, a bitter war and a costly
war… it would leave behind it the embers of a strife which I believe generations would
hardly be long enough to extinguish… to go to war with President Kruger, to force upon
him reforms in the internal affairs of his state, with which [we] have repudiated all right
of interference – that would have been a course of action as immoral as it would have
been unwise.25
His statements showed a strong apprehension to meddle in the affairs of sovereign republics and
indicated that amicable relations with the Boers would be important to the future of the region. In
Southwest Africa, it was widely considered that the Herero should adhere to the policies dictated
by Germany or be removed from the equation. Even Leutwein’s ostensibly conciliatory tactics
strove toward this goal.26
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SECTION II: NONCOMBATANTS BECOME TARGETS
South Africa: “Tactical” Solutions
From 1899 to 1902, conflict raged in the South African republics of the Transvaal and the
Orange Free State. The early stages of the war were characterized by large-scale engagements.
Sizeable forces met in pitched battles until the British successfully invaded the Transvaal and
occupied its capital, Pretoria, in June 1900. Rather than concede defeat, the Boer generals
adopted a policy of guerilla war. They concentrated their efforts on British supply lines,
communication depots, weapon caches, and troop columns. Relatively small groups known as
commandos were extremely successful at harassing the British forces in this manner. 27 The
British were at a loss with how to deal with these tactics, and consequently began to employ a
different strategy, “scorched earth,” which was instituted under the direction of Lord Frederick
Roberts, who served as commander of the British military forces until December 1900. Although
scorched earth did not become official military policy until early 1901 when Lord Herbert
Kitchener, Roberts’ successor, took over, it was used in practice during the summer of 1900.
Roberts instructed troops to “take all stores, fodder, etc.,” “burn houses of men fighting against
us,” and “denude the country of all supplies.”28
According to an official summary submitted in Parliament, British forces destroyed 634
buildings between June 1900 and January 1901.29 Roberts ultimately believed that putting
pressure on the civilian population was the best way to bring a swift end to the Boers’
increasingly frustrating guerilla tactics. As the British marched through the countryside, they
razed farmhouses, killed and stole livestock, and burned crops. Military officials sought to deny
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the Boer commandos necessary supplies and hiding places. Scorched earth was initially
presented as a limited policy against only those farms where the occupants had fired on the
British or were known to have harbored enemy troops. In reality, it is clear that, from the very
outset, Boer farms were looted and set ablaze indiscriminately. 30 As 1901 progressed, the
military administration established limitations on this policy, but they only existed on paper. The
practice of farm burning had become so ingrained by this point that it was nearly impossible to
curtail. The countryside was already in shambles due to the war’s previous devastation, and the
added pressure of deliberate property destruction left thousands destitute.31
The British administration needed to develop a solution for the growing number of
refugees, women, and children displaced by the scorched earth policy, as well as surrendered
Boers and their families. While ad-hoc refugee camps began to spring up during the early days of
scorched earth, Kitchener was the first to envision that a formalized camp system, in which
displaced women and children were compulsorily “collected,” could provide a potential solution
to the problem.32 His decision was certainly not without precedent. Spanish General Valeriano
Weyler had employed similar tactics in Cuba several years before. A plan similar to Weyler’s
was even suggested by a British intelligence officer in an August 1900 memorandum.33 While
Kitchener and his subordinates in South Africa continued to use the term “refugee camps” in
early 1901, British politicians, faced with limited reports that suggested the camps’ compulsory
nature, began to refer to them as concentration camps.34
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It is clear that, from the outset, Kitchener had little concern for the well-being of camp
internees. He regularly distanced himself from dealing with civilian matters. His motivation was
to bring a swift end to the war, and in order to achieve this, he was willing to make the displaced
Boers suffer. Kitchener’s initial policy established a differentiated scale for rations. Families of
surrendered Boers received more than women and children whose husbands and fathers were
still on commando. These women and children received no meat. Across the board, no
vegetables were provided, and there was no fresh milk for children and babies.35 The camps thus
became a punitive experience.
Official policy was couched in the language of “protection” for women and children
displaced from the countryside. But for Kitchener and the other proponents of this system, the
basis for the camps always had a dual military purpose. They were intended to remove all
sources of support and intelligence for Boer commandos in the countryside. They were also
intended to entice surrender. Kitchener firmly believed that the Boers would lay down their arms
in order to join their loved ones in the camps.36 He also staunchly believed that those who were
given “protection” in the camps would actively try to influence the men on commando to
surrender.37 In the words of Colonel Henry Rawlinson, “we shall not stop this guerilla warfare
until really severe measures are taken. The Chief (that is, Roberts) will not, I fear, do this but
when Kitchener takes over the reins of office he will, I expect, be less merciful.”38
The supposed military necessity of the policy blinded its supporters to the reality of the
situation. There was simply no way to effectively care for the camps’ occupants. Because the
policy was hastily enacted, without concern for the enormity of the task at hand, the system was
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plagued by an ineffective selection of camp sites, lack of food, clothing, and medicine, conflict
between British and Boer cultural practices, and rampant disease, all of which contributed to
astronomical mortality rates. The camps were hastily set up in the first place, and it was rare to
find any respite from the seemingly unending influx of new internees. Although the issue of
numbers is still debated, the most recent estimates record roughly 28,000 to 30,000 deaths
throughout the existence of the camp system.39
After the implementation of scorched earth and the concentration camps in South Africa,
civilians could no longer exist as bystanders to combat. Their suffering became a weapon. The
employment of practices like scorched earth and the use of concentration camps indicated that
the British military, faced with an insurgency they were ill-equipped to handle, sought to use the
plight of civilians to force surrender.
Southwest Africa: Policies of Extermination
The beginning of the Herero’s open revolt signaled the beginning of the end for Governor
Theodor Leutwein in Southwest Africa. The Herero were able to press their advantage in the first
few months of the conflict because of the lack of a major standing German force in the area. His
failure to swiftly end the rebellion became an embarrassment in Germany. This development
changed not only the man in charge, but also the general mentality of German conduct. 40 When
General Lothar von Trotha replaced Leutwein, the German military took over the administration
of Southwest Africa. Von Trotha was a “broadsword” sent with the hope of quickly crushing the
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rebellion. His ruthlessness in dealing with native revolts in East Africa (the Wahehe rising) and
China (the Boxer Rebellion) was well known.41
Although the Herero enjoyed some success during the initial rising, the tide of the war
turned quickly in favor of the Germans. Massive numbers of Herero retreated after the first few
months of conflict and gathered with leader Samuel Maherero on the Waterberg plateau, which
was a good distance from German supply lines. After arriving in Southwest Africa, von Trotha
waited for promised reinforcements before engaging in a large-scale offensive against the
Herero. He established an ambitious plan to encircle and crush the Herero at the Waterberg. The
superiority of German forces was enough to destroy quickly any significant resistance. Forced to
retreat, the Herero fled into the nearby Omaheke Desert. Von Trotha knew he had military
superiority, but he was not confident in his ability to annihilate completely all of the Herero at
the Waterberg with his existing forces. A study prepared by von Trotha’s General Staff indicated
that he had purposely left his weakest detachment to defend the path of retreat into the Omaheke:
“If, however, the Herero were to break through, such an outcome of the battle could only be even
more desirable in the eyes of the German Command because the enemy would then seal his own
fate, being doom to die of thirst in the arid sandveld [i.e., desert].”42
After the Waterberg, German conduct took on a distinctly genocidal intent. The next
phase of the conflict consisted of the German troops’ relentless pursuit of the Herero into the
Omaheke. These were not just Herero fighters, but also women, children, the elderly, and the
infirm. Waterholes were poisoned in order to deny the Herero any tools for basic survival, and in

41
42

Drechsler, Let us Die Fighting, 153.
Ibid., 155.

17
October 1904, two months after the battle at the Waterberg, von Trotha issued what came to be
known as the “Extermination Order.”43 It read:
I, the Great General of the German troops, send this letter to the Herero people. The
Herero are no longer German subjects. They have murdered and stolen; they have cut off
the ears, noses and other body-parts of wounded soldiers; now out of cowardice they no
longer wish to fight. I say to the people: Anyone who delivers a captain will receive 1000
Marks. Whoever delivers Samuel [Maherero] will receive 5000 Marks. The Herero
people must however leave the land. If the populace does not do this I will force them
with the Groot Rohr [Cannon]. Within the German borders every Herero, with or without
a gun, with or without cattle, will be shot. I will no longer accept women and children, I
will drive them back to their people or I will let them be shot at. These are my words to
the Herero people. [Signed: The great General of the mighty Kaiser]44
Although brutality against the Herero was already commonplace, the Extermination Order made
it official policy and firmly established von Trotha’s plans for the further prosecution of the war.
He would not negotiate, even with a decimated enemy that could not put up concerted resistance.
The Extermination Order incontrovertibly showed von Trotha’s refusal to adhere to
established international standards regarding the rules of war. Germany was a signatory of the
Hague Convention of 1899, and although Germany was not specifically bound to follow these
codes of conduct in their conflict with native Africans (for the Herero were obviously not
signatories of the document), the document was nevertheless a widely accepted list of agreedupon rules of conduct governing war among “civilized” nations at the time. The Extermination
Order directly violated the provisions stating that it was prohibited “[t]o kill or wound an enemy
who, having laid down arms, or having no longer means of defence, has surrendered at
discretion” and “[t]o declare that no quarter will be given” (Article 23 of the Hague
Convention).45 In practice, Herero men were to be shot regardless of their status as enemy
combatants. In the case of women and children, von Trotha did release a clarification shortly
43
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after issuing the Extermination Order which claimed that his intention was for soldiers to shoot
over their heads to force them away rather than shoot directly at them. Regardless, it is
undeniable that the end result in both cases was death, either from a bullet or dehydration and
starvation in the Omaheke.
The Extermination Order was rescinded roughly two months after its issuance. The
effects of the Herero’s flight into the Omaheke and the prosecution of the war under the
Extermination Order led to the influx of thousands of starving refugees into German towns. This
highlighted the extremely dire situation of the Herero. Their plight in the desert forced them back
into the arms of their oppressor. After consultation with the Kaiser, Chancellor Bernhard von
Bülow issued an order “that the surrendering Herero should be placed in Konzentrationslager
[concentration camps] in various locations in the territory.”46 This practice did not discriminate
with regard to age, gender, or level of participation in the war, and compulsory labor was a key
component of these camps from the outset. Inmates were given supplies only to the extent that
their subsistence did not detract from provisions for German soldiers.47
In the end, the camps proved to be just as deadly as von Trotha’s policy of
extermination.48 Little to no concern was given to their location, the ability to provide supplies,
or the importance of adequate support facilities. Efforts to curb the rapid spread of disease
concentrated solely on the protection of nearby white German communities and allowed illness
within the camps to increase unchecked.49 The camp at Shark Island, located off the coast of the
city of Lüderitzbucht, was a key example of the brutal and horrific nature of German
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concentration camp policy. Inmates were essentially placed in a barren wasteland, forced to fend
for themselves, and worked to death through slave labor.50
The results of the Extermination Order and conditions in the concentration camps were
representative of the overall policy pursued throughout the history of German Southwest Africa.
Census information shows that, by 1911, 75 percent of the Herero population had ceased to
exist.51 German tactics, in opposition to those of the British in South Africa, did not use the fate
of noncombatants to force surrender. Rather, combatants and noncombatants were considered
one and the same, and both were marked for extermination.
Comparisons
The adoption of military tactics that targeted noncombatants occurred in both situations,
but developed in drastically different ways. First of all, Britain had an established colonial
military force. When President Kruger demanded the withdrawal of Britain’s troops on the
borders of the Transvaal, they numbered roughly 10,000. In contrast, Germany had no
established colonial army. Upon the outbreak of conflict, their forces were minimal.
Additionally, the short history of German control in Southwest Africa meant that the region’s
modern infrastructure was severely lacking. At the time of the revolt, the only major railway that
existed ran between the two German city centers, Swakopmund and Windhoek. German troops
were hence small in number and extremely undersupplied. These facts, combined with the
conceptions of native Africans outlined in the first section, suggest a propensity to resort to
brutal methods with a swiftness that was not present in British conduct during the Anglo-Boer
War. Since sheer troop numbers could not be relied upon to keep the native population in line,
fear of German cruelty became the solution. Britain’s adoption of civilian-focused tactics
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(scorched earth and the concentration camps) occurred mainly because of a change in the Boers’
method of warfare. This is not to argue that they were justified in burning homesteads and
imprisoning women and children, but rather that Roberts and Kitchener outwardly represented
their shift in tactics as a response to the Boers’ implementation of guerilla warfare. British
sources that favored these policies consistently maintained that extreme measures were the result
of the Boers’ shift to an “uncivilized” military strategy.52
Germany’s adoption of brutal tactics did not coincide with a change in the Herero’s
methods – the tactics were integral to their military strategy from the earliest stages of conflict.
The revolt itself was a justification for harsh methods. This is evidenced most notably by the
complete suppression of civilian authority and the appointment of Lothar von Trotha. Leutwein’s
stance of negotiation and conciliation was considered a massive failure and led to the elevation
of a man who was essentially his polar opposite. Brutality was a fundamental component of von
Trotha’s previous military career, as was evident in a communication he sent to Leutwein when
he assumed control in November 1904: “I know enough tribes in Africa. They all have the same
mentality insofar as they yield only to force. It was and remains my policy to apply this force by
unmitigated terrorism and even cruelty. I shall destroy the rebellious tribes by shedding rivers of
blood and money.”53 His appointment was predicated on the desire for a swift and forceful
suppression of native unrest by any means at his disposal.54 When traditional methods of warfare
(culminating in the battle at the Waterberg) did not lead to a decisive outcome, von Trotha
quickly resorted to other means by issuing the Extermination Order. The provisions of the
52
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Extermination Order made negotiation with the Herero impossible, and von Trotha confirmed
that this was his outright intention when he distributed the order to his General Staff:
For me, it is merely a question of how to end the war with the Herero. My opinion is
completely opposite to that of the governor [i.e., Leutwein] and some “old Africans.”
They have wanted to negotiate for a long time and describe the Herero nation as a
necessary labor force for the future use of the colony. I am of an entirely different
opinion. I believe that the nation must be destroyed as such, or since this was not possible
using tactical blows, it must be expelled from the land operatively and by means of
detailed actions.55
The way in which noncombatant-focused tactics were implemented in these two
situations sheds light on Britain and Germany’s respective characterizations of their enemy.
Scorched earth and the concentration camps developed as a response to the audacity of a
supposedly civilized people to fight in an uncivilized manner. In Southwest Africa, brutality and
the policy of extermination was a response to the rising itself and its implication that an
“inferior” race was entitled to retain the land, property, and rights of the pre-colonial period.
Although they were consistently unpopular with settlers, Leutwein was given room to pursue his
tactics of conciliation and negotiation for as long as they were able to placate the native
population and keep it in check. Once the atmosphere in Southwest Africa became volatile, the
conciliatory approach was discarded in favor of forceful suppression. In addition, German
authorities continued to support the colonial leadership of von Trotha even when he resisted
opportunities to negotiate. It was likely that a truce could have been achieved at the Waterberg
that would have been favorable to the Germans and preserved elements of native infrastructure
necessary for the creation of an effective labor force. The decision to keep von Trotha in power
displayed a powerful tendency toward extermination, even when it ran counter to efforts that
could have helped ensure the longevity of the colony.
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Isabel Hull argues that this tendency was linked to the “cult of the offensive” that existed
within the German military at this time.56 To Hull:
the first default method [of German warfare]… was the decisive, concentric battle; when
that failed, the second default method of German military doctrine called for a relentless
pursuit of the enemy, forcing them to turn and fight, thus giving the technologically
superior force the edge and bringing the war victoriously to a close.57
While Hull’s arguments provide some explanation for the progression of German tactics that
culminated in the “pursuit” phase in the Omaheke Desert, they are far too generalized to explain
the shift that led to the development of the concentration camps. If the “cult of the offensive”
was as pervasive an element of Germany militarism as Hull maintains, why was the “relentless
pursuit” of the Herero abandoned before complete victory was achieved? Exterminatory
tendencies remained apparent in the administration of the camp system, but the shift from
outright murder to imprisonment showed the importance of punctuated instances of opposition to
German conduct (a subject that is addressed in Section III).

Hull fails to address these

meaningful developments in her account.
In addition to scorched earth and the extermination policy, the administration of the
concentration camps systems provides distinct evidence of the differing conceptions of Boer and
Herero. The defining characteristic of the camps in South Africa was mismanagement, while in
Southwest Africa it was purposeful cruelty. The British hastily enacted an extremely ill-advised
wartime measure in the hope that it would lead to the enemy’s surrender. They lacked the food,
medical supplies, and trained staff to house a massive displaced population already ravaged by
the effects of war. In certain cases, they choose poor sites based solely on convenience and
proximity to rail lines. Huge numbers of Boers died due to disease from cramped conditions.
But, Boer prisoners were not forced into conditions of compulsory labor, as in Southwest Africa.
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The emaciated prisoners of the German camps were considered a disposable commodity.
German authorities undertook massive projects, such as the construction of a jetty to block the
harbor of Swakopmund, on the backs of these starving Herero.58 Additionally, while certain
campsites in South Africa suffered from poor placement, the colonial administration
purposefully located one of the largest camps in Southwest Africa (Shark Island, or “Death
Island,” as it came to be known) on a barren rock island, with its inmates consistently exposed to
freezing ocean winds.59 The policies of extermination in Southwest Africa espoused the view
that the inferior Herero, through their revolt, had displayed their true nature and could no longer
be considered as deserving of any place in the new German society. Even after authorities
ostensibly reversed the policy, the camps continued this belief in death through overwork.
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SECTION III: THE PUBLIC AND POLITICAL SPHERES
South Africa: Activists for Relief and their Influence in Parliament
A letter which appeared in the New York Herald in April 1901 was one of the first
accounts to draw significant public and international attention to the South African camps.
Louise Maxwell, wife of the military governor of Pretoria, “claimed she was writing ‘in the
name of little children who are living in open tents without fires, and possessing the scantiest of
clothes.’”60 She sought charitable contributions for relief, claiming that the current funds had
been exhausted by the demands of war. Her words prompted a major response from the British
government. Maxwell’s situation was a complicated one. Her letter appeared on the heels of a
request by her husband for additional supplies to provide for camp inmates. While this request
also brought attention to the conditions in the camps, it remained within military and government
circles and thus did not expose the lack of resources to the general public. When Maxwell’s letter
appeared, authorities came down hard on her husband, since they had no official authority over
her actions. This did not go unnoticed by Maxwell. The Times published an addendum in which
Maxwell downplayed her original account. It was an attempt to stem any accusations of neglect
on the part of the camp administration and affirm that authorities were doing all they could to
care for the internees.61 However, as far as public awareness was concerned, the damage was
done. The importance of Maxwell’s letter lay not only in its exposure of camp conditions, but
also in Maxwell’s status as the wife of a prominent British military authority in South Africa: “It
was the first public admission, from a military source, that all was not well in the camps.”62 The
British Cabinet openly denounced Maxwell’s appeal for aid, claiming that it “has given rise to
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statements that Boer families have been neglected by the government.” 63 This remark indicates a
willingness by top governmental authorities to deny the initial reports that emanated from the
camps.
Maxwell’s account was referenced in the House of Commons several days after it was
released. Liberal Member of Parliament (MP) John Ellis inquired about the administration’s
current efforts in “alleviating the situation and mitigating the sufferings of the women and
children.”64 Secretary of State for War St. John Brodrick was forced to admit, at this early stage,
his overall lack of knowledge about the current conditions in the camps, but then proceeded to
blindly assure Ellis that all proper measures for relief were being taken.65 This practice of
deflection became a trend among parliamentary leadership and fomented opposition in the House
of Commons. Liberal MPs challenged Brodrick’s lack of information on nine separate occasions
between February and June 1901. Brodrick consistently evaded their questions, touting outdated
statistics about the number of people in the camps and the mortality rates and making
unsupported claims that conditions were steadily improving.66 He also expressed his displeasure
to General Kitchener about the latter’s infrequent and insufficiently detailed communications: “I
have to live from hand to mouth in all these matters and shall have to stand daily attacks in
Parliament in parrying which I am far more likely to give you away than if I knew what to
say.”67 These early inquires in Parliament showed growing anger over the lack of information
provided by the leadership. The overwhelming desire to address camp issues was evident in the
fact that two of the most significant debates on the subject occurred when Liberal MPs brought
63

Quoted in Spies, Methods of Barbarism?, 200.
Hansard, 4th ser., vol. 92, col. 897.
65
Ibid., cols. 897-8.
66
Hansard, 4th ser., vol. 89, cols. 1021-2; Hansard, 4th ser., vol. 90, cols. 180, 557, 1026-7; Hansard, 4th ser., vol.
92, cols. 897-8; Hansard Parliamentary Debates, 4th ser., vol. 93 (1901) cols. 407-8, 929-31, http://hansard.
millbanksystems.com/sittings/1901/may/ (accessed March 19, 2015); Hansard Parliamentary Debates, 4th ser., vol.
95 (1901), cols. 78, 540-3, http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/sittings/1901/jun/ (accessed March 19, 2015).
67
Quoted in Spies, Methods of Barbarism?, 300.
64

26
up the camps during a motion for adjournment and a response to a speech made to Parliament by
King Edward VII. They felt that their attempts to raise the matter through traditional
parliamentary procedures had failed to garner a meaningful response.68 Political opposition only
grew more intense as vivid firsthand descriptions of camp living conditions, such as that of social
welfare activist Emily Hobhouse, came to the fore.
Emily Hobhouse had developed liberal views and a passion for social work at an early
age, but spent much of her young life caring for her ailing father. After his death, Hobhouse
traveled to the United States and carried out relief work in a small mining town in Minnesota.
Upon her return to England and following the outbreak of the Anglo-Boer War, Hobhouse
became heavily involved in the South African Conciliation Committee. She served as honorary
secretary for the women’s branch of the organization. Well-known for her motivation to help
victims of oppression, Hobhouse was incensed by the news coming out of South Africa about the
concentration camps: the “constantly renewed picture of women and children homeless,
desperate and distressed, formed and fixed itself in my mind and never once left me. It became
my abiding thought…I saw myself amongst the sufferers bearing relief.”69 In October 1900,
Hobhouse established the South African Women and Children Distress Fund. She was warned
that her efforts would likely be perceived as critical of British conduct of the war and precipitate
backlash, but she proceeded nonetheless. Her ultimate goal was to visit the camps, document the
conditions, and provide whatever assistance she could.70
After overcoming multiple administrative obstacles, Hobhouse was able to visit some of
the concentration camps. She had to obtain official permission from Kitchener, and he only
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allowed her to visit a limited number of camps. These limitations suggest that Kitchener was
aware that “his house was not in order and he did not want to be bothered by a civilian
outsider.”71 Hobhouse’s requests coincided with the expansion of the scorched earth policy. This
was a period in which the camp populations were growing at an exponential rate and camp
administrators were struggling to deal with the influx of new internees. The dismal living
conditions and soaring mortality rates horrified Hobhouse, who regularly wrote letters home
detailing what she saw. In her letters, she consistently requested that they be sent to press outlets
for publication. Upon her return, she was surprised to find that these requests had not been acted
upon. Her brother Leonard realized the potential for controversy inherent in her accounts, and
thought it best that her revelations not be made public while Emily was still in South Africa, for
fear that authorities might put a stop to her relief efforts. This made Hobhouse consider her task
of exposing the conditions that much more urgent when she returned to England. 72 Hobhouse
was making preparations for her return when Louise Maxwell’s articles were published.
Hobhouse was conflicted about the content of Maxwell’s original letter. Though inspired by the
attention it had brought to the situation in the camps, she refused to believe that Britain lacked
the funds to care for those it had brought under its “protection.”73 She campaigned relentlessly
for the Boer women and children, showing her wholesale rejection of the claim that all possible
measures were being taken to provide for the camps.
Hobhouse did not go directly to the press when she arrived in England. She instead
decided first to approach St. John Brodrick, Secretary of State for War. He had recently
made a speech in Parliament, trotting out all the old specious arguments. Boer women, he
blandly announced, were flocking to the camps for food and “protection against the
Kaffirs,” some 20,000 to 40,000 women had sought asylum; there was “no occasion in
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which these camps’ food ran short,” and there had been “immense improvements” in
living conditions.74
This indicated to Hobhouse that authorities were pathetically unaware of the reality of the camp
situation. At her request, Hobhouse was allowed a meeting with Brodrick, but supposedly had
difficulty securing Brodrick’s attention: he was “‘ready to listen, also ready to drift’…
[Hobhouse] had got through the interview by clinging to the belief that, as she had repeatedly
told the Boer women, the people of England would never tolerate the suffering in the camps once
it became known.”75 But, Brodrick gave no immediate response, and a distressed Hobhouse went
to the press. In mid June 1901, she wrote a scathing exposé of the camp system that appeared in
newspapers and was circulated among members of Parliament.76
Hobhouse’s report was unflinchingly critical of the entire policy of concentration. The
camps were “wholesale cruelty” that involved “murder to the children.”77 Her extensive
interviews revealed the indiscriminate nature of scorched earth: “In most cases there is no
pretence that there was treachery, or ammunition concealed, or food given, or anything. It was
just that an order was given to empty the country.”78 In a total of roughly seventy-six transcribed
interviews, only four women explicitly stated that their homes and belongings had remained
intact and undamaged by British soldiers.79 Hobhouse’s report was rife with descriptions of illplanning and mismanagement in the camp system. The administration severely underestimated
the necessary amount of supplies and support staff and lacked key knowledge of the South
African terrain (for effective camp placement) and of Boer culture. Overall, the camps were
wholly unable to cope with the massive and immediate growth that the policy entailed:
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If only the camps remained the size they were six weeks ago, I saw some chance of
getting them well in hand, organizing and dealing with the distress. But this sudden influx
of hundreds and thousands has upset everything, and reduced us all to a state bordering
on despair. More and more are coming in. A new sweeping movement has begun,
resulting in hundreds and thousands of these unfortunate people either crowding into
already crowded camps or else being dumped down to form a new one where nothing is
at hand to shelter them.80
Hobhouse went on a speaking tour upon her return to Britain and was often harassed by
those who considered her unpatriotic. Her requests to hold public speeches met with denial on
several occasions. After she was refused a hearing at the Darlington Assembly Hall in June 1901,
for example, Hobhouse stated that “though she had addressed 20 meetings, she had only been
interrupted at two, while she had never been absolutely refused a hearing.” 81 Soon after, in early
July, authorities stymied Hobhouse’s attempt to hold a public meeting at the Old Town Hall at
Scarborough.82 The import of her critical voice, however, was clear. Even articles in The Times
(a conservative, pro-government news outlet predominantly critical of Hobhouse) attested to her
popularity. They described a number of the large meetings she addressed and the attentiveness of
the crowds.83 Her speeches, which presented a graphic representation of conditions in the camps,
consistently inspired emotional responses by the attendees. Listeners regularly lined up to meet
Hobhouse following her presentations. Some nobles also stood behind Hobhouse in her quest for
reform. During her absence from London on her speaking tour, Lord Ripon consistently
pressured the War Office in her stead, demanding that significant aid be sent to alleviate the
suffering of the internees.84 Certain moderates and even staunch imperialists were also affected
by Hobhouse’s revelations. Even though many still supported the war, they saw the potential for
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the situation in the camps to bring, in the words of Reverend Charles Gore, “a stain which we
will not be able to obliterate.”85
Emily Hobhouse certainly did not shrink from mounting criticism of her views. Many
spoke up in staunch support of British conduct and the necessity of the scorched earth and
concentration camp policies. They painted Hobhouse as naïve and subject to “feminine
sympathies.” Lord Windsor attacked her for her supposed lack of knowledge of the conditions of
war, claiming that the suffering of civilians was an inevitable consequence. 86 Major General
Robert Baden-Powell noted that “Miss Hobhouse has evidently been such a short time in South
Africa, and is so little acquainted with the manners and customs of the individual Boer that she is
quite unaware that he (and more specifically she) is one of the finest exponents in the art of
bluff.”87 A Times correspondent reported that “these families themselves [i.e., the Boer
prisoners] are eager to acknowledge the kindness with which they are treated, except when they
see the chance to pour lamentation into the ear of sentimentalists.”88 Hobhouse fired back, using
her status as a firsthand observer to her advantage: “Working as I did in close touch with people
born and bred in the country I discovered that our views on the camps coincided exactly
excepted that mine were more moderate. These fellow workers were of various nationalities –
English, German, and Dutch.”89 Her statements showed that she did recognize the reality of the
situation in South Africa, and she even admitted her own shortcomings:
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Common sense tells one that the standard of life cannot be the same in war time as in
peace… He [Baden-Powell] says I am ignorant, and that is true. But in one piece of
knowledge I have an unhappy advantage over him. To my share fell the awful experience
of being in the midst of the sickness and suffering which precedes and accompanies such
a mortality.”90
The key importance of Hobhouse’s efforts was her ability to garner significant political
support. MP David Lloyd-George continued his paramount role in bringing camp conditions into
political discourse, raising the issue in the House of Commons on the very day that Hobhouse’s
report was published. Lloyd-George had been likely the earliest and most vocal political critic of
the concentration camp policy. In July 1900, he had openly compared the policy to the brutal
methods employed by Spanish General Valeriano Weyler in Cuba, methods that had sparked
significant criticism in Britain several years before.91 Lloyd-George specifically referred to the
“English Lady” Hobhouse as a chief factor in bringing camp conditions to light, and his forceful
words echoed her outrage:92
“The Herod of old,” he was reported as saying, “sought to crush a little race by killing all
the young children. It was not a success, and he would commend that story to Herod’s
modern imitator.” This was very much the line he took in the parliamentary debate. He
accused the government of pursuing a policy of “extermination” against women and
children. It might not be a direct policy but it had the same effect.93
Lloyd-George latched on to Brodrick’s previous admission that in May 1901 alone, 250 children,
47 women, and 39 men had died in the Transvaal camps. To Lloyd-George, this proved that “so
far from this being the result of temporary conditions, it is growing worse.” 94 His comments
prompted significant backlash from St. John Brodrick, who claimed he was misrepresenting the
situation in the camps. Although his motion was defeated, the ethical and moral issues inherent
in the use of concentration camps entered the political arena. Those politicians who had written
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off the suffering in the camps as a temporary condition could no longer deny the reality of the
situation. Time alone would not heal the system. In order to stem the death toll, and action had to
be taken. In the words of MP Herbert Lewis, these revelations were due in large part to the
“evidence at first hand, taken from a considerable number of the camps by a lady [i.e.,
Hobhouse] whose word will command implicit confidence from everyone who knows her.”95
Henry Campbell-Bannerman, the leader of the Liberal Opposition in the House of
Commons, agreed to a face-to-face meeting with Emily Hobhouse upon her return to England.
Later she recalled the meeting to Campbell-Bannerman’s biographer:
The interview… remains vivid in my mind. Of all whom I saw at the time, deeply
interested as they were, he alone, greatly occupied as he was, seemed to have the…
determination to hear and understand everything… For nearly two hours… he listened
with rapt attention, now and then putting a question to elucidate a point. He left the
impression of a man who spared no time or pains to arrive at the truth and in whom
wisdom and humanity were paramount.96
Although Campbell-Bannerman had secretly favored a pro-Boer position for some time leading
up to this meeting, he did not openly declare it until after his encounter with Hobhouse. 97 In a
famous speech shortly thereafter, he declared, “When is a war not a war?... When it is carried on
by methods of barbarism in South Africa.”98 Several days later, Campbell-Bannerman weighed
in during the debate in the House of Commons over Lloyd-George’s proposed motion and voiced
his suggestions for reform in the camps:
What I object to is the whole policy of concentration, the whole policy of destroying the
homes of women and children, driving them in circumstances of considerable cruelty…
What I would urge upon the Government is to send out a staff of nurses and competent
civilian medical men… I am quite certain that this is the course which humanity dictates,
and it is the only course which will convince these unhappy women and children, so far
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as they can realise the circumstances, that the British people really care for them and
desire to save them from unnecessary pain and suffering.99
Campbell-Bannerman specifically referenced the “reports of the gallant and plucky lady” as the
key inspiration for his charged words, and expressed his admiration for her individual efforts in
providing relief to the camps’ occupants.100
Campbell-Bannerman’s criticisms met with opposition in the House of Commons.
Nationalists were more than willing to color him as unpatriotic and weak, unable to stomach the
measures they considered necessary to win the war. However, in the end, it was the suggestions
of Campbell-Bannerman and his Liberal counterparts that were eventually adopted in South
Africa. In another speech in Parliament in mid January 1902, Campbell-Bannerman outlined the
recent changes in the conduct of the war and the treatment of prisoners.101 His statements about
the curtailment of scorched earth and improvements in the concentration camps at the inaugural
meeting of the London Liberal Federation led to cries of “Shame!” and “Miss Hobhouse!,” and
he harshly criticized those who failed to speak out against colonial practices: “If the man who
held his tongue has his admirers or partisans anywhere it cannot be among the Ministers of the
Crown, for they have acted upon the recommendations which he failed to make.”102
Liz Stanley recognized that the “significance accorded [Emily Hobhouse’s] work has
derived particularly from how it underpinned the publicity and campaigning activities she
engaged in, which ensured that the plight of Boer women and children remained on the political
agenda.”103 Hobhouse’s revelations were of key importance in the effect they had on politicians
like Lloyd-George and Campbell-Bannerman. Essentially, she paved the way for open criticism
99

Hansard, 4th ser., vol. 95, col. 599.
Ibid., cols. 599, 601.
101
“Sir H. Campbell Bannerman On Liberal Policy,” Times (London), January 14, 1902, The Times Digital Archive
(accessed through the University of Michigan, September 24, 2014).
102
Hansard, 4th ser., vol. 95, cols. 573-629.
103
Liz Stanley, Mourning Becomes: Post/Memory, Commemoration, and the Concentration Camps of the South
African War (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2006), 77.
100

34
of Kitchener’s conduct of the war. Exposure of camp conditions precipitated change when it was
channeled through the proper medium. When Lloyd-George, Campbell-Bannerman, and their
Liberal compatriots took up the cause of reform, Hobhouse’s campaigning gained a muchneeded political voice. The opposition voiced by these politicians, spurred by the writings of
Hobhouse, eventually led to a resolution by the National Liberal Federation. It deplored “‘the
terrible rate of mortality among the women and children in the concentration camps’ and urged
the government to take immediate steps to remedy their present condition.”104 As conditions
within the camps began to improve in early 1902, Liberal MP John Dillon remarked that when
“men talk now about what the Colonial Secretary is doing, I remember that it was because public
opinion had been stirred up by her [i.e., Hobhouse].”105
Even when MPs did not specifically reference the work of activists like Hobhouse, their
political pressure helped to drive reforms in South Africa. Heated debates began to occur in
British Parliament in mid 1901, and they continued well into the following year. While the
Nationalists, on the whole, supported the policy as it was painted by Kitchener (a necessity of
war), the Liberals expressed open opposition both in public and in the House of Commons. The
parties’ opinions on the camps were, generally, a reflection of their larger opinions on the war
itself. The Nationalists expressed broad support for colonial expansion and supported military
action against the Boers from its earliest stages. British victories in the formative period of the
war helped the party win the majority in the House of Commons during the elections of 1900.
Their success in this election was the result of distinct fractures among the Liberals, which
resulted in the development of two distinct factions – the Liberal Imperialists and the so-called
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“pro-Boers.” Some, such as Henry Campbell-Bannerman, attempted to occupy a middle ground
which tacitly supported the war, but opposed the government’s aggressive diplomacy in South
Africa. Ultimately, the situation in the concentration camps proved to be a source of unity in the
Liberal Party, and the disparate elements reached wide agreement in their opposition to camp
policy.106
For many Liberal MPs, the situation in the camps was a stain on the reputation of Britain
that would have far-reaching consequences for the country’s continued colonial presence in
South Africa. The camps were diabolical – a dishonour, a disgrace, an infamy, and an affront to
British ideals. These politicians expressed the firm belief that British policies were instilling
hatred that would make future effective governance next to impossible.107 For example, James
Bryce openly considered the camps to be the largest source of continued animosity towards the
British in both republics, as well as in the Cape Colony, maintaining the “infinite harm done to
the minds of the Boers.”108
A consistent theme among the camp policy’s political opposition was the issue of delayed
action to improve living conditions on the part of the government and camp administration. They
considered it a criminal act to postpone steps toward significant reform once it became clear that
the war would continue for some time and that these camps were not “merely temporary
things.”109 Politicians who had consistently pressed for details on the camps, had called attention
to the dismal conditions, and had urged reform throughout 1901 expressed their frustration in the
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debates of 1902 that the administration had not acted on their recommendations.110 They levied
charged accusations that the government had failed to use “common sense,” had “turned a deaf
ear to suggestions,” and had “been blind to the consequences of their actions.” 111 Henry
Campbell-Bannerman effectively summed up this viewpoint, taking into account the role of both
public and political criticism in eventually overcoming apathy toward camp reform on the part of
the British government:
[W]hy were these reforms not sooner undertaken?... Why this delay of months before the
nurses and civilian medical men were sent out? Why? The Government waited until the
public opinion of the country was shocked at the death rate in the camps. There was no
promptitude, there was not even a reasonable hurry. Lord Milner[, High Commissioner
for South Africa,] telegraphed on November 21st[, 1901], although our suggestions were
made on June 17th[, 1901], and the Government ought to have realised the state of things
long before that, and what did Lord Milner say in that telegram? He says, “Things will
only be made worse by flurried action.” Flurried action! Flurried action five months after
we had pleaded that immediate and strenuous action should be taken!… I am…
complaining of… the whole system which, without any provision at all adequate, swept
in 100,000 people, and then for months waited on Providence until the mortality of the
camps became a public scandal.112
South Africa: Organizations, Foreign Opinion, and the Press
A number of committees formed by British citizens also responded quickly and
powerfully as the situation for the inmates in the camps became known to the public. They
lodged numerous complaints in the closing months of 1901. In addition to the public presentation
of petitions and resolutions decrying British conduct, some of these committees were able to cull
meaningful support from local political and religious figures. For example, the South African
Conciliation Committee
adopted a resolution expressing their condemnations of the policy of the Government,
which has led to the continuance of this unhappy war, has resulted in the devastation and
depopulation of two once contented countries, and in bringing into concentration camps
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the Boer women and children, where the death-rate, according to our Government
returns, has reached the unprecedented total of 264 per thousand per annum, and of the
children alone 433 per thousand per annum.113
The exposure of camp conditions also led to the formation of the Manchester
Concentration Camps Committee. In late 1901, this group wrote an official petition in response
to camp mortality rates. It was signed by the Lord Mayor, the Lord Bishop, and roughly 4,000
residents of both Manchester and the city’s surrounding neighborhoods. These residents,
according to The Times, included “many leading citizens representing all shades of political
opinion.”114 The petition deplored the reported death rates and pleaded for “radical alterations” to
current camp practices. In addition, the Committee stated their staunch commitment to assist in
any reform efforts.115 For its part, the Women’s Liberal Federation considered the
“unprecedented rate of mortality” in the camps to be “a reproach to the nation.” 116 In the
Federation’s estimation, the camps would likely prove to be the most significant obstacle in the
way of postwar reconciliation between the British and the Boers. The group thus called on all
Liberal members of Parliament to push for swift action to improve conditions in the camps. Their
criticisms formed the basis for an official resolution submitted by the Lancashire and Cheshire
Liberal Women’s Union, which described the situation “as a case of willful neglect which almost
amounted to intention.”117 In addition, a large majority of the union’s members defeated the
proposal of an amendment to this resolution, ostensibly moved by Nationalists “who had come to
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the meeting under false colors,” which attested to the original humane intentions of the camp
system as well as the good work of the authorities under the circumstances.118
Overall, the stance of these organizations ascribed the mortality in the camps directly to
mismanagement by the government and consequently increased the pressure on authorities to
take action. Resolutions and statements such as those made by the members of the Lancashire
and Cheshire Liberal Women’s Union took a strong position on the operation of the system.
Those who administered the camps were no longer making the best out of a bad situation, they
claimed, but continuing to pursue a course that resulted in suffering and death en masse. These
groups essentially maintained that if prompt steps were not taken to improve the lot of the
camps’ inmates, further death could not be considered the result of negligence, but rather a direct
intent to destroy the Boer population. Additionally, the pledge of support by the Manchester
Concentration Camps Committee indirectly spoke to the inability of the government and colonial
authorities to remedy the situation without outside assistance.
One particular source of opposition from within the camps themselves inspired an official
international response. Hansie van Warmelo, who served as a nurse in the camp at Irene
experienced firsthand the ramifications of the haphazardness and mismanagement that plagued
camp administration, as well as the often coldhearted nature of camp officials. According to van
Warmelo:
The women prefer to suffer and starve with their children, even when twenty are herded
together in one tent, almost without bedding, rather than expose themselves to insults
when they approach with their needs. Is it considered such a crime in these present days
to fight for home and independence, that it is wreaked on defenceless women and
helpless children, in order to compel the… men to surrender? We earnestly beseech you
to take steps without delay to relieve the suffering of these unfortunate beings.119
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The petition received no response from Kitchener or the British administration. A frustrated van
Warmelo then brought her petition to several foreign representatives in Pretoria, which prompted
consuls from Portugal, Austria, and Germany to establish the Diplomatic Corps and apply for
permission to inspect the camp at Irene. Ultimately, this gathering of foreign powers forced the
authorities’ hand, and they allowed a visit. The subsequent report established the number of
deaths in the camps to be fourteen times higher than the normal rate in Pretoria, and it
highlighted the scarcity of food, the atrocious living conditions, and the dismal state of medical
and sanitation services.120
The case of Hansie van Warmelo provided one instance in which the campaigning of an
individual led directly to international criticism. But, as knowledge of British tactics became
more widespread through exposure by prisoner advocates such as Emily Hobhouse, negative
opinion in foreign circles became a much larger source of worry for the supporters of scorched
earth and the concentration camps, especially when it began to appear in The Times. The
statements made by pro-Boer groups in Austria with regard to the British conduct of the war
were particularly virulent. The terms used included systematic murder, inhuman, and barbarous
terrorism.121 The Christian Socialists openly asked, “How was it to be accounted for that the
whole world did not venture to tell Englishmen that they were tyrants and cruel executioners for
dragging thousands of women and children into the concentration camps and then doing them
slowly to death [i.e., slowly killing them]?”122 In addition, Socialist leader Emile Vandervelde
levied strong accusations again the British in Belgium’s Chamber of Representatives, referring
specifically to the writings of Hobhouse. He accused the British of barbarous conduct,
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buttressing his argument with appeals to existing international law: “I know that the South
African republics were excluded from the Hague Conference; but does this mean that they are
beyond the pale of humanity?” His remarks drew applause from members of both the political
left and right.123
British conduct also came under scrutiny in the French press. An article in the newspaper
Le Temps stated that in “Africa the farms were burned en masse, the fields ravaged, the
noncombatants flung together in the concentration camps, while proclamations pretended to
inflict punishment on belligerents contrary to international law. This is the scandal denounced by
the conscience of the world.”124 Le Temps remained critical even after the British had announced
their plans for camp reform in late 1901. Another article claimed that “these decisions are… very
tardy, when thousands of innocent lives have been lost which should and could have been
spared… [The] confession they implicitly contain is… made in a surly tone seasoned with unjust
attacks against the initiation of this reform.”125
It is unsurprising that opposition to British conduct of the war in South Africa became a
topic of interest in the Irish National Convention, where the general theme of the war against the
Boers, that of a colonial power interfering in the affairs of sovereign republics, surely struck a
chord. The comments of nationalist Michael Davitt referred to the concentration camps as
“Herodian infamies”: “The braggart English, defeated again and again by inferior numbers in the
field, their generals disgraced, resolved to make war upon foes who could not strike back; they
resolved to make war upon the women and children for the base purpose of trying to induce the
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commandos to lay down their arms.”126 Criticism of British tactics also appeared in the Spanish
newspaper, Liberal, which referred to Chamberlain as “determined to persevere in a war of
extermination,” and described Kitchener as “the organizer of concentration camps, burner of
farms, and implacable executioner of prisoners.”127 Pro-Boer contingents in several major
American cities convened large meetings that expressed outrage over the concentration camps.
One of the speakers was William Jennings Bryan, who “considered it a disgrace that no official
expression of sympathy for the Boers had yet been made by the United States Government.” He
believed the U.S. should “make an effort to end the horrors of the concentration camps and the
war, which ‘by its unexampled ferocity and enormous cost of life… has astounded the civilized
world.’”128
Public figures in the Netherlands voiced strong criticism of British tactics in South Africa
as well. In a quote in a Vienna newspaper that was reprinted in The Times, Dutch Prime Minister
Abraham Kuyper reportedly claimed that “there are no more Boer children, they have all died in
the concentration camps.”129 Charles Boissevain, an eminent Dutch journalist, was another wellknown proponent of the Boer cause. His article, “The Law of Nations and the Law of
Humanity,” appeared in the Dutch newspaper Algemeen Handelsblad and levied powerful
accusations against the British:
The British Government ought either to have offered acceptable and honourable terms of
peace to the Boers or else have overwhelmed them with irresistible force, acting
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according to the honourable usages of warfare. But it has neither the moral courage to do
the first nor the soldiers and the conscience to do the last.130
It was difficult for the British to ignore detractors in European who had a shared heritage with
the Boer people. The Times felt obliged to respond strongly to Boissevain’s comments, stating
that he
purposely overlooks the fact that these evils are the inevitable result of the reckless
warfare by which the Boers are prolonging their resistance, and that the British
authorities have done their best to mitigate them. The whole spirit of the letter is inspired
by the well-worn theory that all British acts are barbarous, and all those of the Boers are
sublime, a theory which – making all allowance for exceptions on both sides – has long
been abandoned by more moderate writers on the Boer side.131
Germany was by far the harshest critic of British conduct in South Africa. Newspapers
and politicians spoke out against scorched earth and the concentration camps, and pro-Boer
groups formed several large relief committees and organizations. The National-Zeitung and
Berliner Tageblatt responded vociferously to Chamberlain’s claim that German conduct in
France in 1870 had set a precedent for Britain’s current practices in South Africa: “We would
ask him [Chamberlain] where in France there was a wholesale massacre of children such as,
according to English accounts, is being enacted day by day in the so-called concentration
camps.” The Tageblatt maintained that “it would be simply an impossibility to intensify the
cruelty of the present methods of warfare of the ‘butcher’ Kitchener.”132 Germania, a Catholic
publication, expressed anger over Britain’s refusal to allow German aid to be sent to the camps,
stating that “the British refusal will cause deep feeling among the German people.” It asked
“whether England desires to turn the camps into pits for murdering Boers with the object of
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destroying the Boer nation.”133 The Ladies’ Relief Fund for Boer Women and Children spoke out
in “universal protest against ‘a war with women and children… There is in the whole civilized
world no heart susceptible of feeling which would not be filled with warm indignation against
such a system.’”134 Responses from Times correspondents attempted to address the overall
negative German conception of British conduct in South Africa. One stated that
scores of…falsehoods [are] disseminated every day among the German people…that the
whole policy of the concentration camps has been deliberately conceived with the
purpose of killing off the Boer women and children has been dinned so continuously into
German ears that the vast majority of the Germans actually believe these things.135
Another criticized the Pan-Germanic League and the Boer Relief Association of
propagating the worst calumnies with regard to the conduct of the British in South Africa.
Their adherents and those who have derived their information from the publications of
these societies have been taught…to regard the concentration camps and places where
Boer women and children were “deprived of their liberty and menaced by the gravest
dangers to their health, their honour, and their lives.”136
Much of the commentary by the foreign press on scorched earth and the concentration
camps was overwhelmingly negative. Terms such as extermination, atrocities, and murder were
consistently used. There was clearly a tendency to dwell on the gravest details of reports from
South Africa. These harsh criticisms became part of the public discourse and the British
Parliament recognized the effect they could have on the nation’s international prestige. During
debate in the House of Commons in late January 1902, John Dillon stated that the camps “have
aroused the indignation of the whole civilised world outside of Great Britain,” and Reginald
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McKenna spoke of the policy’s inherent danger to Britain’s foreign relations.137 Lord Windsor
maintained that criticism was
bad enough if it is only for the ears of English people, who can weigh the merits of this
particular form of attack against His Majesty’s Government in regard to our military
operations; but it becomes much worse when such things are read by people in foreign
countries, who are very often not friendly disposed towards us, and who certainly,
however willing they might be, have not the opportunity of sifting the matter to the
bottom.138
In a particularly telling response, MP John Lawson Walton stated to his constituents in South
Leeds “that he had read with pain the slander in foreign newspapers, and he had blushed to see
that these were founded on the loose, haphazard language used by orators in this country.”
Lawson admitted to a degree of “carelessness” in the creation and initial management of the
camp system, but maintained that it was “humane in design” and a necessity due to the actions of
the Boers. 139
There were many instances in which the scorched earth and concentration camp policies
engendered criticism in public forums, but they also received significant support. In fact, it was
not difficult for Britons to find opposition to the viewpoints of “radicals” like Hobhouse. Times
correspondents were more apt to criticize during the early stages of the war than when the Boers
became “irreconcilable” and refused to fight in a “civilized” manner.140 More to the point, The
Times gave little credence to the writings of Hobhouse. It “consistently took the line that the
sufferings were regrettable, but that in the long run it was kinder to be cruel and that the remedy
lay in the hands of the women themselves, who should urge their men to lay down their arms.”141
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It is undeniable that Hobhouse had significant influence on the public’s view of the camps, but
this was not the only perspective available for public consumption. Additionally, the readership
of The Times was predominantly from the upper echelon of British society. Hence, those who
had the most influence were presented with consistent reinforcement of official government
policies.
Immediately following the publication of Hobhouse’s report, The Times found it
“necessary to set forth once again the true aspects of the case, which have been too much
obscured by mistaken sentimentalism and by an astonishing incapacity or unwillingness to
recognize the necessities imposed by the peculiar character of the war in its present stage.” 142
The paper vehemently defended camp policy as a military necessity, essentially maintaining that
all Boer women were acting as spies, which “would have justified their removal and detention
simply and solely as belligerents.”143 The article, nevertheless, went on to say that the creation of
the camps first and foremost reflected humanitarian concerns. The policy of scorched earth and
“clearing the country” were never questioned, and the camps were painted as the salvation for
women and children who would have otherwise been left in the open to survive on their own.
Generally, The Times presented scorched earth and the concentration camps as not only a
military necessity, but the only option available to the British once the Boers turned to guerilla
warfare. Correspondents presented the farms of South Africa as supply depots and intelligence
hubs, and women became the commissaries and devious spymasters. Moreover, the British were
not only justified in burning the farms and turning out their inhabitants: their policy of
concentration was supposedly a compassionate and benevolent action in the context of modern
warfare.
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Many articles that took a defensive stance in the wake of Hobhouse’s revelations
appeared in The Times following the growth of international and domestic criticism in mid to late
1901:
The truth is that the Boers and not we are properly responsible for keeping Boer women
and children alive; that our efforts to do so are carried on in the teeth of every obstacle
that they can put in our way; that they are perfectly satisfied with the existing condition
of affairs which gives them a free hand to carry on their peculiar warfare; that had we left
these women and children to the ordinary chances of war the mortality among them
would have been indefinitely greater than it is; and that, such as it is in our hands, it is
very greatly due to the inveterate Boer habits, which kill off most of the children in
infancy at all times.144
The policy of concentration was mainly due to another consideration, that of humanity.
When the guerilla methods of the Boers rendered it necessary to clear the country of
supplies, the authorities were presented with the alternative of letting the women and
children starve on their farms or of bringing them together and feeding them themselves.
The former course might very possibly have been more effective in bringing about the
surrender of the Boers. But we decided upon the latter, because we did not wish to have
upon our conscience the suffering which the alternative policy might have involved.145
Another article applauded plans to break up the concentration camps into smaller units and the
installation of permanent dwellings (as opposed to tents), but stated, at the same time, that the
Boers’ own sanitary practices were the largest contributor to mortality and would ultimately
emerge as the main roadblock to a sustained decrease in the death rate.146 For its part, The Times
selectively reprinted communications from Kitchener to Brodrick in an attempt to present them
as incontrovertible evidence that the concentration camp policy had been “forced” on Kitchener
by the actions of the Boers.147
The increase in these types of defensive articles suggests that the opposition was gaining
ground and British conduct required defense in the public sphere. Correspondents attempted to
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soften the consequences of scorched earth and the concentration camps by shifting blame to the
Boers for both the adoption of these tactics and the camps’ high mortality rates, vacillating
between claims about military necessity and/or the humanity of these policies, and latching on to
any reports that indicated plans for the improvement of camp conditions.
Southwest Africa: Missionary Activism, the Press, and Contemporary Literature
German conduct in Southwest Africa did not benefit from the same level of public
exposure at home as that of the British in South Africa. Sources of opposition in the colony were
much less prevalent, and critical treatment in the press occurred mainly in non-German
newspapers. In addition, German responses to critical press treatment revealed a general lack of
understanding of (and an unwillingness to understand) the Herero’s dire condition. These
responses displayed a tendency to promote the stereotypical viewpoints of “inferior” native
Africans that were so prevalent among German settlers, and had helped create the volatile
environment that sparked the initial revolt. In addition to press outlets, these viewpoints were
also disseminated in popular German contemporary literature, and were key thematic elements in
one of the most widely published colonial novels of the era.
Protestant missionaries from the Rhenish Missionary Society were the most outspoken
critics of German conduct in Southwest Africa. This organization was one of the most significant
missionary societies in Germany at the time, and its presence in the region began in 1842.148 The
mission generally avoided involvement in political entanglements, but its overarching
philosophy opposed the exploitative practices that occurred throughout the history of German
colonialism, and was distinctly anti-nationalist, running directly counter to the opinions of
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government and colonial authorities.149 Shortly after the uprising, missionaries disseminated
reports blaming the actions of the settlers for the revolt and denying accusations of excessive
barbarity on the part of the Herero. These reports engendered significant backlash from
nationalist press outlets and government officials, who painted the missionaries as traitors. Even
Chancellor von Bülow, who later attempted to defend the Herero in response to the brutality of
von Trotha’s policies, spoke out strongly against the mission’s viewpoints in the immediate wake
of the revolt: “In a war, the place of missionaries is on the side of their fellow countrymen. I can
grant them neither the right of neutrality between Germans and Herero nor the office of
complainant or judge.”150
Missionary Heinrich Vedder visited the concentration camp in the major city of
Swakopmund shortly after it received its first significant shipment of prisoners. He documented
the horrific conditions and communicated the information to his superior, Dr. Gottlieb
Haussleiter. The latter appealed to von Trotha, who “adamantly refused to allocate more money
‘for the better provisioning of prisoners.’”151 After an appeal to Berlin, Deputy Governor
Tecklenburg tasked the district administrator of Swakopmund, Dr. Fuchs, with assessing the
situation. His discoveries were sobering: “I regard the cause [of the high mortality rate among
native prisoners in Swakopmund] as inadequate accommodation, clothing, and food, in
combination with the raw, unaccustomed climate and the weakened condition of the prisoners
brought here.” He recommended “accommodation in dry, ventilated but wind-fast rooms, warm
clothing (flannel shirts, pants, blankets, shoes) and some variation in the diet (rice, flour, if
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possible frequently meat, onions, or oil), and medical care.”152 The statistics in Fuchs’ report
exemplified just how dire the situation was. The annual death rate in the Swakopmund city jail
for the years 1903 and 1904 was 1.7 percent. For the final two weeks of May 1905, the camp’s
death rate was 10 percent.153 Fuchs also compared the mortality in the camps to that of the native
Africans under the care of his local government: “As long as I have been here [i.e., since
September 15, 1903] not even a single one has died.”154
Fuchs’ paramount recommendation was to remove the Herero with failing health from
the coastal camps to the interior of the colony to facilitate their convalescence and “avoid
decimation.”155 Regardless of humanitarian concerns, Fuchs’ recommendations made pragmatic
sense in order to maintain a strong native labor force, a concern that was (and remained) a
consistent undercurrent of German colonial policy in Southwest Africa. In the end, however,
Tecklenburg and Rear Commander Colonel von Dame refused to act on the suggestions in
Fuchs’ report. They considered the labor needs at Swakopmund and Lüderitzbucht to be too high
to engage in any changes in the number of available workers, despite their overall health.156
Although the sickly Herero could only provide short-term, low-quality labor (at best),
shortsighted economic motives overshadowed any improvement in their conditions.
Critical treatment of practices in Southwest Africa appeared most prevalent in the British
newspapers of the Cape Colony. Well before the uprising, in 1897, a German lieutenant had led a
small party of troops against native Africans alleged of stealing cattle. The Cape Times reported
that
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the whole tribe was practically annihilated. As an instance of the way in which the
Germans treated rebellion, there were at the close of the war twenty odd prisoners in the
hands of the Germans… On the way [to trial] any falling out, unable to walk, were shot
on the spot, and the remained [sic] at arrival… were tried and shot.157
In September 1905, the Cape Argus ran a scathing series of articles detailing German atrocities.
In reports from Angra Pequena, where the Shark Island inmates were used for labor, women
were “made to work until they die. If one falls down of sheer exhaustion as they constantly do,
they are sjambokked [i.e., beaten with a heavy whip].”158 According to the testimony of a British
accountant working in Angra Pequena:
Children as young as five or so years of age are made to work and are ill treated like their
unfortunate elders…Heavy loads of sand and cement have to be carried by the women
and children, who are nothing but skin and bone…When they fall they are sjamboked by
the soldier in charge of the gang, with his full force, until they get up. Across the face
was the favorite place for sjamboking and I have often seen the blood flowing from the
faces of the women and children and from their bodies. 159
A particularly visceral portion of the man’s testimony described a supposed instance in which a
woman and the baby she was carrying were both beaten with a sjambok after the woman had
collapsed while working. The Cape Argus reported that, according to several of their informants,
the response of the soldiers, when asked about the beatings, was that “The Kaiser has ordered us
to do this.”160 This series of articles in the Cape Argus was based on two separate rounds of
interviews with camp observers. This fact suggests that these were not singular, punctuated
instances of brutality, but practices endemic in one of Germany’s largest concentration camps.
The Cape Argus also printed several responses to the above series of articles by Germans
living in Southwest Africa. These responses provided indications of the German colonists’
feelings about conduct with regard to the Herero:
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I consider they [African natives] are well treated – in many cases too well, as to be utterly
spoiled for good work… In Angra Pequena, I have only seen a few women at work, most
of the prisoners being kept on an island in the bay [Shark Island], connected with the
shore by a bridge. This island is reserved for prisoners and as no constrution [sic] works
are carried on there, nor are there any sheds or stacks of goods, the poor blacks can
hardly be made to work too hard – if they work at all. In Swakopmund a goodly number
of women can be seen working… They have to load and unload trucks and push them
along for little distances, but although this may look as if they were working hard, this is
not the case.161
This author’s statements reveal a profound ignorance of the reality of the Herero’s situation. He
clearly had no knowledge of the nature of Shark Island as the holding area for inmates who were
consistently taken offsite to carry out work projects. He essentially turned an admission of the
barren conditions on Shark Island into supposed evidence that the inmates are not forced to do
hard labor. In addition, despite his general claims about light work and the “spoiling” of the
Herero, he admitted that he did not have any firsthand knowledge to deny the specific incidents
in the initial articles.162 Another response stated that a
point raised by your correspondents is that women captured with rebellious Herero have
been shot. I believe that this had actually happened, but if it was known that it is the
custom of the Herero women to cut from the wounded but still living soldiers and
particularly officers pieces of their flesh… and to give them roasted to their husbands,
thinking to instill them with the courage of the fallen, then one will hardly wonder that
the soldiers can sometimes not be constrained from killing such bestial creatures.163
These statements reiterated specious claims about the savage nature of the Herero, as well as
justified the existence and continuation of German brutality. Overall, the German viewpoint
evidenced in these articles was characterized by a lethal combination of ignorance concerning
Herero living and working conditions and sensationalism regarding Herero wartime conduct.
These responses suggest a distinct lack of concern for the consequences of German rule for the
country’s colonial subjects, and a willingness to accept stereotypes that were widely promulgated
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and served to solidify the characterization of native Africans as lazy, brutal savages, undeserving
of any semblance of fair treatment. These views were not confined to the press, and they
appeared as overarching themes in literature that became extremely popular in Germany.
Numerous publications flooded Germany in the wake of the Herero uprising. Overall,
these contemporary sources justified German colonial practices in Southwest Africa. The
wholesale murder and extermination of native Africans was considered a necessary part of
Germany’s “civilizing” mission and a natural consequence of the confrontation between
“whites” and “blacks.” German methods were “seen as a reasonable and justifiable contribution
to carrying out and fulfilling a universal process in developing a global culture.”164
Unsurprisingly, many of these publications were written by authors with colonial backgrounds,
distributed by colonial and military press outlets, and were popular predominantly in circles
concerned with colonial politics. However, works by authors with no vested colonial interest and
aimed at a broad middle-class audience were also widely read. Friedrich Meister was one of the
most prominent authors in imperial Germany. His book Muherero riKarera (“Watch out,
Herero”) was published in 1904 as a Jugend- und Familienbuch (“Book for Young People and
the Family”). To Meister, the conflict in Southwest Africa was “a race war between blacks and
whites and it must be fought to a final conclusion. Either the Herero must submit, or they will be
exterminated. Nothing else can be imagined.”165
Gustav Frenssen’s Peter Moors Fahrt nach Südwest was the most successful and widely
disseminated contemporary work regarding the Herero uprising. A fictional account of a German
soldier and his time fighting against the Herero, the book was peppered with vivid descriptions
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of native atrocities against Germans, effectively painting a picture of the Herero as brutal
savages: “On this slope, on the long dry grass in front of the huts, lay the naked, mutilated, halfdevoured bodies of many of our men. Some of us were silent; some gnashed their teeth, doubled
up their fists, and cursed; other mocked and said: ‘How long will it be before we are lying [sic]
that way?’”166 Frenssen’s prose consistently seemed to suggest the impossibility of coexistence
between Germans and the Herero. These “blacks are quite, quite different from us, so that there
could be at heart no possible understanding or relationship between us. There must always be
misunderstandings instead.”167 As recognized in the British Blue Book of 1918, Frenssen avoided
extended descriptions of barbarity on the part of the German soldiers.168 Periodically, however,
“slips of the pen” revealed glimpses of “merciless inhumanity and uncalculated ferocity”169 – for
example, with regard to the pursuit following the battle at the Waterberg: “The general decided
to follow them thither, to attack them and force them to go northward into thirst and death, so
that the colony would be left in peace and quiet for all time.”170 Frenssen also described
encounters between soldiers and starving groups of Herero:
Telling them with threats not to move, we looked through the bundles which were lying
near them and found two guns and some underclothing, probably stolen from our dead.
One of the men was wearing a German tunic which bore the name of one of our officers
who had been killed. We then led the men away to one side and shot them. The women
and children, who looked pitiably starved, we hunted into the bush.171
The main theme of Frenssen’s book was the elevation of the “civilizing mission” inherent in
Germany’s colonization of Southwest Africa. Frenssen concluded that the annihilation of the
Herero was a prerequisite for cultural advancement:
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These blacks have deserved death before God and man, not because they have murdered
two hundred farmers and have revolted against us, but because they have built no houses
and dug no wells… God has let us conquer here because we are the nobler and more
advanced people. That is not saying much in comparison with this black nation, but we
must see to it that we become better and braver before all nations of the earth. To the
nobler and more vigorous belongs the world. That is the justice of God.172
The impact of Peter Moor was enormous: sixty-three thousand copies were printed in its
first year of publication. Editions were also printed in English, Danish, Dutch, Afrikaans, and
Swedish, and special student editions were produced for use in German schools. The edition used
in schools contained notes that referenced real-world historical information, such as dates,
people, and places in an effort to provide legitimacy to Frenssen’s fictional account.173 The
extreme popularity of the book in Germany and its promotion in the educational system tended
to indicate both a wide public agreement with its themes and a desire by the government to
imbue German youth with Frenssen’s message. This was exemplified further by the notes that
were added to the student editions – the provision of authoritative links to historical figures and
events showed a desire to lend further credence to book’s overarching message. The use of the
book in schools suggests that the racial “values” it contained were considered important not only
to contemporary German society, but to the future of the country and its colonial mission.
Southwest Africa: Viewpoints in German Politics
Significant debate about German conduct in Southwest Africa occurred in the Reichstag,
and the Social Democratic Party constituted an anomaly in conceptions of the Herero. They were
the only group in the Reichstag that engaged in efforts to determine the extent of destruction
wrought upon the Herero by Germany’s brutal tactics. The party also criticized the prosecution
of the war in its central organ, Vörwarts.174 The Social Democrats’ conceptions of the universal
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rights of man meant that the party took a significantly more sympathetic stance toward the
actions of the Herero than other parties within the Reichstag. Social Democrat August Bebel was
arguably the most vocal defender of the Herero people in German political discourse. Following
the rebellion, he openly discussed the unjust application of the German Credit Ordinance and
established it as one of the key causes for revolt.175 This put him in a minority position, one
which put the blame on Germany for the outbreak of conflict. He was one of the few to ascribe a
degree of humanity to the Herero, considering them a people deserving of rights rather than a
mass of barbarous savages. He even used the term Volk to describe them, essentially maintaining
that the Herero constituted a nation that was “structurally equivalent” to those in Europe.176
To Bebel, the Herero were justified in their rebellion, acting as any “civilized” nation
would when its property was taken away and its people were denied basic human rights.
Particularly of note are comments in which he inverted negative conceptions of native Africans.
The conflict in Southwest Africa was a war “in which not only no men are taken prisoners but
also whatever is living and has a black color, including women and children, is shot down.” This
was “not only barbaric, but bestial.”177 These remarks took stereotypical, clichéd conceptions of
native Africans (that of beasts and savages) and ascribed them to the colonizer instead of the
colonized. Bebel’s tactics attempted to “make violence visible, thus making it the object of
critical reflection.”178
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Bebel’s statements in the Reichstag also called into question the role of government and
military leadership in purposely perpetrating an immoral war of extermination. With regard to
the Extermination Order, he posited:
I don’t know whether Herr Von Trotha acted on his own or according to a similar slogan
to the one made [by Kaiser Wilhelm] in 1900 [during the Boxer Rebellion]: “Take no
quarter, behave so that no Chinese will dare to look askance at a German for a 1,000
years…” Herr Von Trotha must have received secret instructions as to how he was to
proceed in South West Africa; I find no other explanation for the fact that he, a general,
ordered his men to disregard every principle of military law, civilization and
Christianity.179
With these comments, Bebel showed his willingness to take a critical stance against the conduct
of the war which took aim at the highest authority in Germany, the Kaiser. In addition, this was
not the first time Bebel cast an unfavorable light on German practices in its colonies. He had
previously expressed vocal opposition to conduct in China several years before. In his
estimation, it was “a commonplace war of conquest and a war of revenge and nothing more… a
war of revenge so barbarous that it has found no equal during the last centuries and not often in a
history at large.”180 That an equal to this barbarity was found in Southwest Africa serves to
indicate a theme of violence that permeated Germany’s colonial history.
Conceptions of the Herero as deserving of rights and even Bebel’s references to them as
their own Volk, or nation, were tempered, however, by persistent ideas of an established racial
hierarchy. However much he believed that the Herero constituted their own nation, the socialist
leader openly referred to them as primitive, a “wild people, very low in culture.” 181 Essentially,
humanity was ascribed to the Herero, but Bebel was a hesitant to place native Africans on the
same plane as Europeans. In addition, the Social Democrats succumbed to widely-held
nationalist sentiments in the immediate wake of the uprising and did not present a concerted
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front in the Reichstag against increases in the influence of the military over the existing civilian
administration.182
The Center Party was the political organ of the German Catholics and occupied a
significant minority within the Reichstag. The party’s platform had consistently focused on
natural rights, and this belief led to limited criticism of colonial conduct in Southwest Africa. In
response to von Trotha’s extermination order, Peter Spahn, a deputy for the party, noted that
violence was an inseparable part of war, but also that “we must prevent extermination.”183 The
Center Party did voice limited opposition, but lacked the level of conviction that existed among
the vocal members of the Social Democrats. The Center Party’s members exhibited a
“profoundly felt desire to be accepted as patriotic,” which severely limited their propensity to
criticize the conduct of the military.184 Ultimately, the party’s major contributions to the rights
discourse surrounding Southwest Africa were limited to Catholic concerns, most notably their
support for upholding mixed marriages between Germans and native Africans.185
Left Liberals discussed Germany’s colonial efforts in Southwest Africa as well, but
placed limited emphasis on what they considered to be universal ideals of humanity. Their views
were of a “practical humanity,” not a “sentimental cosmopolitanism.”186 The language of the
party’s views was consistently couched in terms of the separation of the races. Ernst MüllerMeiningen, who had been a prominent party member since 1898, stated:
Would it not be possible, much as we have reservations for wild animals, much as we
have Indian reservations in North America, to build reservations for the natives in the
interest of the native groups whom culture does not easily penetrate?... [I]f the blacks are
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to be preserved alongside the whites, then it is indispensable to sharply separate the two
races from one another.187
The National Liberals and Conservatives were also willing to grant the native Africans a
degree of humanity, at least in terms of their ability to undergo “cultural raising.” But, these two
parties, more than any of the other groups, strongly emphasized distinctions based on a racial
hierarchy. Hartmann von Richthofen, a National Liberal deputy, claimed, for example, “The
native who is supposed to learn from the white must see him as a being who stands far and
powerfully above him.” Conservative Wilhelm Lattmann maintained that “a reasonable
humanity must be paired with a reasonable stance of domination… the black race, even when it
accepts Christianity, cannot from the standpoint of race be considered to be of equal worth to the
white race.”188 In response to Bebel’s assertion that the Herero constituted a Volk, Lattmann
responded, “A more backward conception of colonial affairs… does not exist.”189 Overall, the
National Liberals and Conservatives did not share the views of other groups in ascribing any
degree of inherent human rights to native Africans – if they stood in the way of “progress” (that
is, the progress of white civilization), they would be dealt with accordingly. Under no
circumstances should they be granted any semblance of equality with whites. If violence was
necessary to further the progress of German colonial interests, then it was necessary and justified
violence: “Common to both [parties],” Helmut Smith argues, “was the increasing willingness to
accept brutality in the service of an idea and the increasing blindness to the violence done, not to
nations or classes, but to humans. And this was possible… because – increasingly – they did not
see the individual humans involved were quite as human as a white man or white woman.”190
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Some political groups criticized the brutality that occurred in Southwest Africa, but the
formation of a concerted opposition that could stem Germany’s cruel colonial practices never
materialized. Bebel was certainly the most critical of the situation, but even his arguments were
tempered by the racial views that permeated German politics. However much the Herero were
considered as deserving of human rights, there was a solid undercurrent among all groups that
supported the idea of a racial hierarchy. Criticism of the treatment of Africans by the German
colonial apparatus faltered when faced with these views of native inferiority. Violent action was
regularly promoted, accepted, or excused, depending on the party, in pursuit of this ideal.
Chancellor Bernhard von Bülow responded quickly after the Reichstag began debating
the conduct of the war. In a communication to Governor Leutwein early in the conflict (March
1904), he stated: “Press reports of letters from the protectorate cause me to point out that steps
are to be taken to prevent violations against humanity, against enemies incapable of fighting, and
against women and children. Orders in this sense are to be issued.”191 Although documentary
sources indicate that orders to this effect were never actually conveyed, this occurrence provides
evidence of von Bülow’s opposition to harsh tactics in the formative period of the conflict and
provides context for his reactions to later developments.192
Von Bülow strongly opposed the appointment of von Trotha as military leader in
Southwest Africa.193 He was well aware of the brutality that defined von Trotha’s previous track
record as a colonial commander. Von Bülow responded to the Extermination Order issued by
von Trotha by drafting a report that he presented directly to the Kaiser. The report centered
around five major points, both moral and pragmatic: (1) generally, the order was “contrary to the
principles of Christianity and humanity”; (2) “a complete and systematic annihilation of the
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Herero would exceed all the demands of justice and of the reestablishment of authority”; (3) the
plan was unachievable and extremely expensive; (4) it would cause irreparable damage to the
colony’s economy; and (5) it “will demolish Germany’s reputation among the civilized nations
and feed foreign agitation against us.” His report implored the Kaiser to issue to a new
proclamation that would offer clemency to those who chose to surrender.194 Von Trotha strongly
opposed the suggestions outlined in von Bülow’s report, which meant it could not have a
significant effect until von Bülow was able to secure the approval of von Trotha’s military
superiors (i.e., General Alfred von Schlieffen, Chief of the General Staff, and Dietrich von
Hülsen, Chief of the German Imperial Military Cabinet). The Kaiser would only support the plan
once it had the backing of these key officials.195 Von Bülow was able to persuade von Trotha’s
superiors, and in early December 1904 a telegram from the General Staff cancelled the
Extermination Order, stating that the Kaiser wanted “to treat mercifully those Herero who
voluntarily surrender and to spare their lives, except for those directly guilty and their
leaders.”196 This telegram came in the wake of charged comments by von Bülow in the
Reichstag, where he stated that “we are not so cruel and we are not so stupid as to think that the
only means of restoring orderly conditions is to be found in shooting down those half-starved
Herero bands, dying of thirst, who are streaming out of the desert. Of this there can be no
question.”197
Later developments ultimately served to complicate the legacy of von Bülow with regard
to the treatment of the Herero. Once the Extermination Order was rescinded, a strategy needed to
be developed to deal with the Herero still alive. Von Bülow sent a communication to von Trotha
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that outlined the establishment of “concentration camps where the rest of the Herero people
would be placed and kept for the time being.”198 However, at this juncture, it was unlikely that
von Bülow had the ability to foresee the full extent of horror and death that would come to define
the camp system. In fact, von Bülow’s orders to von Trotha specifically referenced that efforts to
provide adequate support for imprisoned Africans should be priority when establishing the
camps: “[W]e need to take up the offer of the Mission [to provide relief]… This arrangement
appears not to be done without, especially in regard to the women and children.”199 This
statement suggests that von Bülow recognized the danger that his new policy, under the direction
of von Trotha, could result in the continuation of the latter’s exterminatory tactics. This led him
to specifically reference the only organization in Southwest Africa actively engaged in relief
efforts.
Comparisons
Opposition voices in Britain benefitted from a relatively open forum to provide their
arguments for public consumption. This was demonstrated, in part, by the fact that even the
nationalist Times was willing to print critical pieces. Individuals and groups both foreign and
domestic saw their opposition appear in its pages. In addition, Emily Hobhouse was able to put
together a very successful speaking tour, despite several instances of severe opposition. Overall,
the conditions in the Boer camps were attacked publicly by many opponents. In the case of
Germany, missionaries provided the only concerted public activism. Negative press appeared
predominantly in southern Africa, and most often in non-German outlets. By and large, the true
facts of the situation in the Boer camps gained much more exposure in the United Kingdom than
those in Southwest Africa did in Germany.
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Emily Hobhouse’s detractors criticized her supposed excessive sentimentality toward
Boer women and children and railed against any veiled claims that the death in the camps was
encouraged by the British administration. They sought to portray Boer sources within the camps
as liars, but they were hard pressed to deny the mortality rates and firsthand observations present
in both the accounts of activists and official government sources. When the system’s proponents
mounted a defense, they focused their arguments on the necessity of the policy as a response to
the intransigence of the Boers, stressing the “humanity” they believed was inherent in a strategy
ostensibly designed to “protect” civilians. The majority were willing to admit to the camps’
haphazard organization and expressed regret about the high death rates. In contrast, the language
in German responses to criticism consistently evoked a view of Africans as a commodity, not
people. They made no claims that the camps were created for humanitarian purposes, and
maintained that the Herero deserved to be brutalized and forced into slave labor as punishment
for resisting their colonial masters. Camp supporters relied on references to the Herero’s
“barbaric” nature, a viewpoint based on sensationalized, stereotypical accounts. In fact, it is well
documented that the Herero treated captured German women and children extremely well.200 The
key difference between discussion about the concentration camps in Britain and Germany was
the presence, at least to some degree, of regret in the arguments of the system’s supporters. The
policy was deemed necessary in both cases, yet in South Africa, it took on the distinct tone of a
necessary evil.
The popularity of literature in Germany that glorified the brutality of the Herero
campaign provides an excellent window onto the reasons for this lack of regret. Frenssen’s Peter
Moor painted the conflict as a race war in which the heroic colonial power was destined to
conquer the savage natives. The Herero were to assume their subservient place in a new German
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Southwest Africa or be unequivocally destroyed. Frenssen focused heavily on ideas of racial
inferiority and their role in creating an insurmountable rift between German and Herero, one
which made coexistence impossible. The native Africans’ “primitive,” “low” culture meant that
they must wholly submit to the “progressive” German influence or face elimination. According
to this school of thought, the Herero were not marked for death only because of their decision to
revolt, but also because they had “dug no wells.”201 Surely, camp supporters in Britain also
painted the Boers as uncivilized (or, at the least, less civilized than their British counterparts), but
they largely focused on issues like medicine and hygiene as an explanation for high death rates,
and consistently maintained that colonial authorities were doing everything possible to protect
the Boer inmates. The importance placed on representing the camp system in South Africa as a
humane measure was entirely absent in the case of Southwest Africa. Overall, sources of support
in both cases considered camp occupants as deserving of imprisonment, but only the Herero
deserved to die en masse.
While extreme racial views in support of brutality against the Herero were widely shared
in German political circles, they were not all-encompassing. Certain groups voiced their
opposition to exterminatory policies as detrimental to the overarching German goals in
Southwest Africa. August Bebel and the Social Democrats were certainly the most vocal, and
their campaigning shared many commonalities with that of Henry Campbell-Bannerman and the
Liberal Party in Britain. Bebel and Campbell-Bannerman levied accusations that struck at the
highest levels of colonial and home-country leadership and used similar language in referring to
the “barbarity” inherent in their respective nation’s methods of warfare. The major difference
between the two situations was the inability of German political opposition to reach a level that
could force the hand of home-country authorities in a significant way. Even in the case of the
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Social Democrats, the group that most vocally opposed annihilative German policies, there was a
racist component to their language and views. While less prevalent in the opinions of the Social
Democrats than other German political parties, there was an overall resistance to make assertions
that Africans deserved the same treatment and considerations that whites would in the same
situation. Additionally, voices of political opposition in Germany did not have a vocal firsthand
observer around which to rally. While Hobhouse was not the only voice of public dissent in
Britain, her detailed report supplied extensive political ammunition and was consistently
referenced. In the case of Southwest Africa, the report of Dr. Fuchs could have provided a
galvanizing effect similar to that of Hobhouse, but Fuchs did not publicly expose the Herero’s
dire situation. This was likely due to the potential of losing his position – his original mandate
from Deputy Governor Tecklenburg was to investigate the matter “discreetly and without saying
why.”202 The report failed to inspire change because it ultimately existed only within the realm of
the colonial administration, and it lost any potential influence when it was cast aside by
Tecklenburg.
Critical politicians in Britain did not have to account for race in their arguments, and they
benefitted from the fact that the British had lived alongside the Boers in numerous South African
colonial situations for nearly a century and developed strong relationships. In addition, a
significant pro-Boer contingent existed both in Britain and on continental Europe, and the Boers’
cultural heritage dictated a strong connection with the Netherlands. Germans had only existed
alongside the Herero in Southwest Africa for a short period of time. Their history together, while
not plagued with the excessive brutality of the period following the rebellion, was defined by
exploitation, claims of African inferiority, and unwillingness on the part of the German settlers to
attempt to live peacefully side-by-side. Negative opinions of the Boers were certainly prevalent,
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but tended to focus on their “primitive” hygienic practices, use of holistic medicinal remedies,
and invocation of guerilla warfare. Their way of life was considered less modern, but their
essential humanity was not denied. As shown by the both the political and international response
to Hobhouse’s account, the image of a white woman and her children suffering, starving, and
dying evoked a much more sympathetic reaction than in the case of native Africans. Thomas
Pakenham astutely observed that the “conscience of Britain was stirred by the holocaust [sic] in
the camps.”203
A key difference in these two situations was the level of importance accorded to a
potential breakdown in relations between the colonizer and the colonized. British activists and
politicians who criticized wartime practices presented their arguments from the standpoint that
the future of South Africa, even with a British victory, entailed the British and the Boers living
alongside each other. While some did argue that the poor planning of the Boer camps and the
subsequent mortality tended toward a policy of extermination, it was clear that an outright policy
to this effect was never a consideration. German voices of opposition had to deal with the
contention, held by the highest level of colonial authority (i.e., von Trotha), that German
Southwest Africa would benefit from the complete removal of the “savage” presence. However,
the example of Chancellor Bernhard von Bülow showed that resistance did have the ability to
effect change when those in positions of power felt compelled to exert their influence.
Opposition only had an effect when humanitarian arguments were mediated by pragmatic
concerns such as the maintenance of a strong labor force, the potential loss of international
reputation, and the expense involved in the continuation of current practices. It was in this way
that von Bülow was able to apply effective pressure on the colonial leadership and achieve an
end to the official policy of extermination.
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SECTION IV: CHANGE AND STAGNATION IN THE PRACTICES OF THE
COLONIAL POWERS
South Africa: A Sanctioned Report and its Results
Growing public and political opposition regarding the concentration camps led the British
government to take action. The War Office established a Ladies’ Commission which it sent to
South Africa to inspect the camps. This action had already been suggested in both houses of
Parliament. In response to Emily Hobhouse’s report, MP William Redmond asked the
government leadership
to inquire if the charges which have been made are true. How can that be done? It can
only be done by sending a fair and impartial Commission to South Africa… Let them
inquire into the conditions of these camps, and if that Commission reports against the
system, in the name of God and for the sake of Christianity I ask you to abolish that
system and to restore these people to the comforts and the decencies of ordinary civilised
life.204
Shortly thereafter, Lord Windsor stated: “I hope it may be possible for the Government to
appoint a commission, including ladies, to visit the camps and report upon their condition.
Before we apportion any praise or blame to those responsible we ought to know the full facts.”205
Led by Millicent Fawcett (a political activist best known for her efforts to gain women’s
suffrage), the Ladies’ Commission was charged with establishing an official account of camp
conditions. Despite her pleas, Emily Hobhouse was not included in this group of women.
Ultimately, the women selected for the commission had public credibility, but the War Office
took care to pick those they believed would support the policy and discredit Hobhouse’s
allegations.206 Fawcett and Dr. Jane Waterson, one of the physicians attached to the commission,
had previously expressed open criticism of Hobhouse. Fawcett wrote an article which accused
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Hobhouse of misrepresenting the situation in the camps, essentially using Hobhouse’s words
against her. For example, she quoted select passages from Hobhouse’s account that created the
illusion that authorities had the situation well in hand. Waterson had referred to Hobhouse’s
campaigning as “hysterical whining” in the Cape Times, scoffing at the thought that food and
supplies should be diverted from British soldiers to feed the “ungrateful” Boers.207
The eventual report of the Ladies’ Commission established the following three main
reasons for high mortality rates in the camps: (1) “The insanitary condition of the country caused
by the war,” (2) “Causes within the control of the inmates of the camps,” and (3) “Causes within
the control of the administration.”208 While the commission’s report heaped significant blame on
the Boers and their cultural practices, it also presented key admissions of mismanagement by
colonial authorities. According to the report, the establishment of the camps under the military
meant that proper attention was not paid to the differences in supplies and accommodations
necessary to care for women and children, as opposed to soldiers. The report highlighted the
poor planning of sites for several camps, particularly with regard to the proximity of a potable
water supply. Although the commission did outline significant problems with sanitation, refuse
removal, and the provision of hygienic facilities, such as bath houses, they excused these issues
by touting the initial view of the camps as a short-term solution. The report also presented a
critical view of the procurement of qualified doctors and nurses for the camps. The commission
derided the government’s delays in sending medical staff, especially with the development of
massive outbreaks of measles, pneumonia, and related diseases:
It would have been well if the Concentration Camps Department in each colony had,
from the very beginning of serious illness in the camps, set about the formation of a
207
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reserve of doctors and nurses, so as to throw quickly into any camp, which required it,
extra help to enable the existing staff successfully to combat the disease.209
The supposed “excessive sentimentality” of Emily Hobhouse’s account was certainly
absent from the report of the Ladies’ Commission, which was a calculated, dispassionate
statement of facts regarding mortality in the camps that did not include any extended interviews
with the camps’ inmates. The choices for quotations on the part of the Boers were selective and
pro-British. One inmate purportedly stated: “Look at this beautiful bread, look at my bag of meal
left over from our last rationing day. Can we complain? I say that if we grumble it is for the sake
of grumbling.”210 With regard to the camps’ schools, an elderly Boer man supposedly
“exclaim[ed] that he believed the British must be God’s chosen people after all, for he had never
heard of any other nation paying for the education of the children of their enemies.”211
Far from sympathizing with the Boers, as Hobhouse did, the report placed a significant
amount of blame for high mortality rates on Boer culture, particularly with regard to hygiene and
medicine.212 While many of their criticisms were valid, such as those about dangerous home
remedies, the report carried a consistent tone of superiority, maintaining an assumption that
indigent Boers should possess the same level of medical knowledge as upper-class English. This
tone was particularly evident in the commission’s lengthy treatment of the “fouling of the
ground,” and the refusal of many Boers to use provided latrines:
It should be remembered that this habit, which is such a source of danger in camp life,
where 5,000 or 6,000 people may be gathered tougher in a comparatively small area, is
comparatively harmless in the life to which the average Boer is accustomed, where
family is separated from family by miles of open country. Their inability to see that what
may be comparatively harmless on their farms becomes criminally dangerous in camp is
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part of the inadaptability to circumstances which constitutes so marked a characteristic of
the people as a race.213
The report essentially criticized the Boers for continuing their normal day-to-day practices. Of
course “fouling the ground” near and in living quarters contributed to the spread of disease. It
was presumptuous, however, for the commission to assume that the Boers, used to living on
farms many miles apart, would immediately understand the importance of changing their daily
habits because of the situation of concentration. In the end, the Boers received blame for high
mortality rates because they had failed to quickly adapt to the completely unfamiliar living
situation which was forced upon them.
Upon the Commission’s arrival in South Africa, a group of women from the Committee
for the Relief of Sufferers of the War called on Millicent Fawcett, outlining their current efforts
in the camps and inquiring how they might assist the work of the commission. They sought to
educate the commission on the best way to interact with Boer women with tactics gleaned from
their extensive experience in the camps since the system’s inception, but they were rebuffed, and
Fawcett later misrepresented their comments after her return to England, claiming, “From the
pro-Boers they got no help whatever.”214 C. Murray, a member of the group that met with
Fawcett, responded to Fawcett’s comments in a Letter to the Editor of The Times, which
provided a summary of the commission’s mentality:
We hoped for some good to come from this commission. I believe that hope has not
altogether been disappointed, but those who are anxious to form correct impressions must
remember one thing, and that is that, in the choice of people sent out officially to South
Africa since this forceful policy began, one quality has always been carefully excluded,
and that is sympathy, which is the key to understanding and real success.215
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While the report furnished by the Ladies’ Commission laid less blame on the authorities
for the plight of the internees than Hobhouse’s account, it did provide a vivid description of the
suffering and death. The report also included extremely detailed statistical information, broken
down by each specific camp the commission visited, an aspect that was largely absent from the
writings of Hobhouse.216 In the end, the commission’s report failed to furnish significant
evidence of declining death rates and improved conditions and was unable to refute Hobhouse’s
allegations.
The sitting in the House of Commons on March 4, 1902 dealt extensively with the report
of the Ladies’ Commission.217 Liberal politicians had been clamoring for information about the
conditions in the camps since early in the previous year, and many expressed their outrage at the
lack of improvement outlined in the report. A major grievance was the disparity between the
account of the Ladies’ Commission and the consistent claims of the leadership, particularly St.
John Brodrick, that Hobhouse’s allegations were extremely exaggerated. Several MPs
specifically referenced details of the report that showed the camp administration’s failure to act
on recommendations made by Hobhouse roughly nine months earlier. According to Francis
Channing, the “list of the items of stupid neglect is appalling.”218 Secretary of State for the
Colonies Joseph Chamberlain and certain Nationalist MPs did their best to deflect the
opposition’s arguments by emphasizing the report’s limited examples of improved conditions,
but they were unable to refute the endemic problems that continued to plague the camp system as
a whole. Liberal MP Arthur Humphreys-Owen was correct in his recognition that the findings of
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the Ladies’ Commission established “the point that the country at large was misled by optimistic
reports, and that it never practically knew the truth until this Report was issued.”219
Historians have differing views on the relative importance of the roles of Hobhouse and
the Ladies’ Commission in bringing about improvements in the camps. Brian Roberts viewed
Hobhouse as the paramount factor in eventual reform. He believed that the chief role of the
Ladies’ Commission was to buy time. Government authorities recognized the impossibility of
rapid improvement and dispatched the commission in order to gain breathing room.220 Paula
Krebs elevated Hobhouse and, to a great extent, discounted the role of the Ladies’ Commission
with her argument that the commission’s findings were unimportant because they served only to
confirm what Hobhouse initially exposed.221 These contentions, which identify Hobhouse’s
activities as the singular force in bringing about reform and largely discount the work of the
Ladies’ Commission, pose significant difficulties. Essentially, as Marouf Hasian astutely
recognized, “the status of the messenger [i.e., a government sanctioned commission, as opposed
to a single independent observer] was just as important as the message.”222 Camp supporters
consistently presented Hobhouse’s arguments as a “hysterical” woman’s overreactions to
wartime conditions. They supposed that she was overcome by emotion and lacked the ability to
dispassionately assess the inherent brutality of war. This characterization sought to discount her
by implying that she was ignorant of the sacrifices inherent in maintaining the glory of the
British Empire.223 It was ultimately the report of the Ladies’ Commission that put the onus on the
British government to take action. Hobhouse’s report could be written off as the rant of a radical
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pro-Boer, but when its findings were confirmed by a sanctioned commission, the facts were
undeniable. Furthermore, although suggestions for improving camp conditions appeared in both
Hobhouse and the commission’s accounts, the Ladies’ Commission ascribed a portion of the
blame to the Boers’ sanitary practices. This fact allowed authorities to act while deflecting blame
from their own actions. Ultimately, the Commission’s findings provided the opportunity to make
changes in the camp system without having appeared to concede to Hobhouse.
Medical advancements, including increases in the number of nurses and improved
nursing practices, were a major component in reform within the camps. Roughly 140 certified
nurses were recruited in Britain and sent to the camps at the end of 1901. The Colonial Office
acted on recommendations from the Ladies’ Commission and created camp matrons. The
matrons developed pervasive day-to-day practices to monitor sanitary conditions and “inculcate
habits of cleanliness.”224 Effective nursing worked in tandem with other medical improvements
in the camps, drastically improving the lot of imprisoned Boers. Reform efforts also included
improvements in the system of probationers. These were young Boer women who essentially
served as nursing assistants, providing an intermediary between British doctors and nurses and
inmates. Camp authorities increased their numbers and began formal training programs. By April
1902, the major camp at Klerksdorp had fifty-three probationers in its hospital.225 Greater
provision of medical supplies and the growth of hospital facilities within the camps also
contributed significantly to the reduction of mortality rates. Colonial authorities made drugs
more readily available, including vaccines against smallpox. They also shipped significant
amounts of medical hardware, particularly thermometers, to the camps. By the end of the war,
the Transvaal camps even had their own onsite laboratories for the analysis of food and water. In
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certain cases, medical authorities instituted convalescent camps to provide for weak inmates
(usually children) who were not currently suffering from any specific ailment. Most camps also
developed isolation sections for newly arrived inmates.226
From an administrative perspective, the change from military to civilian control was a
chief factor underlying improvements in the camps. Sir Alfred Milner, High Commissioner and
head of the civilian administration in South Africa, had returned to England in May 1901.
Previously, although the camps were ostensibly under Kitchener’s control, Milner acted as a
voice of reason in civilian affairs and had worked to soften Kitchener’s purely military
viewpoint. Upon Milner’s departure, Kitchener became the singular source of authority over the
camps. In November 1901, Milner returned and civilian control was reestablished under his
direction. Overall, as S.B. Spies argues, there
can be little doubt that Kitchener regarded himself first and foremost as a soldier and
considered that his military duties should take precedence over civil affairs. It is virtually
certain therefore that he did not, in his capacities as administrator and high commissioner,
give the concentration camps the attention which they would have received from Milner
if he had stayed in South Africa – and what is more, which they did receive from Milner
after his return.227
Advances in education were one of Milner’s top priorities after returning to South Africa and a
significant reform in the camp system in late 1901 and early 1902. The goals and requirements
Milner set for the schools led to an active search for British teachers as 1901 drew to a close.
Press sources indicate that extensive experience (four to five years) working with infants was a
prerequisite for educators sent to South Africa.228 The call for educational professionals extended
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to other British territories in March 1902.229 At the end of 1901, a correspondent for The Times
noted that
when the war broke out the Transvaal, according to its own showing, was giving
education to 14,700 children. Last month the number on the registers of schools opened
under British auspices nearly equaled that total, which will apparently be exceeded at the
end of the present month. In the Orange River Colony, there are about 8,000 children in
the various Government schools. The concentration camps have been utilized to bring
children under educational influences who would have been much more difficult to reach
if scattered about on farms. No compulsion has been used.230
The number of students eventually rose to 17,000 in the Transvaal and 12,000 in the Orange
River Colony. These amounts greatly exceeded those attained during the tenure of the Boer
republics.231 During the parliamentary debate on March 4, 1902, camp supporters, faced with the
grim reality evident in the bulk of the Ladies’ Commission’s report, consistently focused on
these educational advances in order to deflect from issues like living conditions and mortality
rates.232
In December 1901, Kitchener officially ended the influx of people into the camps. In her
extensive social history of the Boer concentration camps, Elizabeth van Heyningen analyzes the
significant effects of this measure for the camp inmates. The haphazard, inefficient, and
unscheduled arrivals of new inhabitants were an enormous contributor to squalid living
conditions. Once the population of the camps became static, it became an easier task to
implement significant improvements in health and living conditions in order to reduce mortality
rates. Relief also came through the construction of new camps along the coast. From the outset,
the construction of these new “model camps” proceeded with the lessons learned in the early
operation of the system. Housing and other camp facilities were far more substantial and the sites
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were carefully chosen. The new housing included systems for improved air circulation to foster
more hygienic living conditions. Although the new camps suffered from issues inherent in the
close concentration of large populations, they provided much better living conditions than their
predecessors. They also helped decrease the amount of new inmates sent to the interior camps,
allowing reforms to be more readily implemented.233
Southwest Africa: Slave Labor and Legal Discrimination
The character of German colonial rule in Southwest Africa changed with the outbreak of
the revolt and the ascension of General Lothar von Trotha, which put the colony firmly under the
control of German militarism. Whereas Leutwein was a civilian governor designated (briefly) to
oversee military operations in the direct wake of the revolt, von Trotha was an iron-fisted general
(as evidenced by his earlier campaigns), whose appointment included oversight of civilian
affairs, a task for which he was wholly unsuited. While the results were indicative of von
Trotha’s solely militaristic viewpoint and inability (indeed, unwillingness) to deal with civilian
affairs, but they also shed light on the “polycratic” nature of Wilhelminian government, which
“consisted of separate, vertical units, integrated, if at all, by the Kaiser, who would choose which
unit would dominate policy in a given situation.”234 Management of the revolt, which was seen
as a security threat, was entrusted wholly to the military and taken completely out of the hands of
the civilian leadership. When von Trotha assumed power, it effectively ended significant civilian
influence in the administration of Southwest Africa. Any subsequent actions, including those that
dealt with non-military affairs, were addressed solely from a military perspective, and were
subject to the ultimate control of a military leader who regularly failed to differentiate between
combatants and noncombatant in the development of his tactics.
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While rare, there were particular instances of resistance to von Trotha’s measures from
within the military itself. Military commander Ludwig von Estorff strongly opposed the tactics
of extermination, viewing them as the key obstacle to bringing about a resolution to the conflict.
His beliefs led him to issue a proclamation to the Herero which was in direct opposition to von
Trotha’s overarching tactics: “I speak the truth, I do not lie. [Upon surrender,] I will send you
there where you previously were… I will issue letters to you so that nothing will happen to you
on the road or at the settlements.”235 Tribal leader Zacharias Zeraua sought to take advantage of
von Estorff’s proclamation. He had negotiated terms with von Estorff and officially surrendered
in January 1905. Per the proclamation, von Estorff recommended to von Trotha that Zacharias
and his followers be returned to their homeland in Otjimbingwe. Von Trotha responded, “Are
these then the circumstances in which the end of this unheard revolt is to be achieved, that now
with our promises we have to beg for peace? This position is the cause of the revolt.”236
Zacharias was ultimately imprisoned and charged with initiating the murder of German settlers,
while his people were used as slave labor.
Von Estorff also officially lodged complaints with the administration of the concentration
camp on Shark Island. In his report to the Colonial Department, von Estorff stated that if the
prisoners “remain on Shark Island they will be facing a slow but certain death… 1,032 out of
1,795 natives have died on Shark Island. I am not prepared to assume responsibility for the
killing nor can I except [sic] my officers to do so.”237 He strongly recommended that the
prisoners be shipped off the island and back to the mainland. His efforts met with opposition
from Oskar Hintrager, the governor’s deputy, who stated that a transfer of prisoners – at this
point emaciated and starving – back to the mainland constituted a security threat. In the end, von
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Estorff was successful in transferring a limited number of women and children from Shark
Island. A report on the subsequent condition of these prisoners indicated significant
improvements in their state of health.238
The example of Estorff shows the inability, even of an officer high up in the military
apparatus, to effect change on colonial policy that would provide some form of relief for native
Africans. Despite von Estorff’s status, the structure of the colonial administration in Southwest
Africa dictated that his recommendations required approval at the top level of colonial authority
in order to be implemented. Von Trotha consistently refused to show leniency toward the Herero,
and this viewpoint was continued by his successor, Governor Friedrich von Lindequist, to whom
Oskar Hintrager served as deputy.239 Faced with a colonial leadership whose fundamental beliefs
were in direct odds with his initiatives, von Estorff was unable to gain support.
Resistance to von Trotha’s campaign of wholesale annihilation ultimately led to the
repeal of the Extermination Order in December 1904, but the tactics of slave labor that replaced
those of extermination were no less detrimental. Exterminatory policies were ultimately deemed
irrational not because the Herero were human beings deserving of natural rights, but because
Germany’s colony needed a labor force. Rather than being killed outright, the Herero were to be
punished for their intransigence in the crucible of the concentration camps and forged into a
docile, productive workforce. According to Deputy Governor Tecklenburg, the Herero had to
undergo a “period of suffering” so that they would not “be tempted for generations to repeat the
uprising.”240 Postwar policy focused on “actively reconstituting them [the Herero] as a
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deracinated, atomized proletariat.”241 Paul Rohrbach, the Commissary for Settlement between
1903 and 1906, succinctly summarized the overarching goal of post-Extermination Order policy:
“Our task is to divest this tribe… of their specific… national characteristics and to gradually
meld them with the other natives into a single colored work force.”242 By the end of 1905,
roughly 8,800 Herero were housed in the camps and employed as slave labor. Lindequist, von
Trotha’s successor, established collection stations (Sammelstellen) with an official proclamation
to the Herero that they “would be less coercive than the concentration camps and that ‘no white
soldiers [would] be stationed’ there.”243 Some 12,500 Herero lived in these stations by March
1907. Lindequist’s promises proved to be intentional lies. Once these Herero were gathered
together, they were sent to the concentration camps and employed as slave labor to build
railroads. Many were even distributed to civilian companies, some of which created camps of
their own. No efforts were made to provide adequately for the Herero laborers, which led to
widespread death because of overwork. One company even created a specialized stamp for its
registers that read “dead due to exhaustion.”244
Limited resistance in public and political spheres contributed to the curtailment of
outright exterminatory policies against the Herero, but did next to nothing to stem mortality
rates. Death from overwork replaced death from a bullet or slow starvation in the Omaheke
Desert. The German government sent no commissions to assess the living and working
conditions of the Herero and suggest remedies, and made no attempts to improve medical
facilities or sanitation, even though these efforts would serve to promote the maintenance of a
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consistent labor force. Even though they were no longer directly targeted for annihilation, they
were subject to policies that had the same effect.
The most outspoken critics of German conduct in Southwest Africa were also the only
ones to engage in relief efforts of any significance. The assistance provided by the Rhenish
Mission was the only source of respite for the Herero, and this aid was not openly sought by the
colonial authorities. When reports began to surface about the conditions in the camps, the
Rhenish Mission undertook an initiative to gather supplies, including clothing, bedding, and
food. Missionary Heinrich Vedder first approached colonial authorities in Windhoek, but his
pleas fell on deaf ears. Subsequently, missionaries distributed publications in Germany asking
supporters to furnish clothing for the prisoners. According to Vedder, “The mission’s friends at
home were not stingy. Very soon came boxes and boxes of clothes that were still, for the most
part, in good condition. They were distributed. The emaciated figures at least had something
warm to put on. There was a fall in the death rate.”245 Vedder also sponsored an initiative for the
mission headquarters to collect money to buy food for the prisoners. The mission created
rudimentary medical facilities in camps where it had a significant presence, such as
Swakopmund: “Following requests by the station missionary [Vedder], a sick bay and a
provisional chapel were erected in the prisoner Kraal, in which often more than 1000 [sic]
prisoners were to be found.”246 The work of the Rhenish Mission should not be discounted, but it
should be noted that it was essentially the only opposing force to the tide of brutality. They
received no support from colonial authorities or the German government to enact their
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improvements in camps. Everything they provided for the Herero was given of their own volition
and they bore the responsibility for distributing the supplies and creating the necessary facilities.
A major contributing factor to the lack of missionary influence on official government
policy was a general reticence to engage in the political debate. Missionary leaders consistently
maintained that commitment to their mission of spreading Christianity must exist separately from
political goals steeped in nationalist beliefs. As early as 1886, Missionsdirektor Ernst Reichel
argued for the defense of the mission’s “godly,…international, and…[politically independent]
character.” He stated, “Colonization and mission must remain cleanly separate from one
another.”247 Colonization, especially in the case of German Southwest Africa, developed distinct
exploitative tendencies, and the mission believed that maintaining a distinct separation from
those tendencies helped preserve the integrity of their work.248
Discriminatory legal regulations established in 1906 and 1907 by Governor Friedrich von
Lindequist, von Trotha’s successor, served to solidify the place of native Africans in the future of
the colony. The efforts undertaken by German officials during the revolt to establish a position of
unquestioned dominance were clearly reflected in these efforts. Lindequist first enacted
regulations that expropriated native land and cattle, effectively denying them the economic basis
for their survival and firmly establishing their position solely as laborers. The most important
development, however, was Lindequist’s “order of the Governor of SWA pertaining to measures
for the control of natives.” The distinction made in this order between “whites” and “natives”
was the first instance of official legal discrimination in German Southwest Africa. “Natives” had
to apply directly to the Governor in order to breed cattle, a right uniformly denied in all cases
during Germany’s colonial rule. Additional regulations sought to deny further native Africans’
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chances for economic self-sufficiency and dismantle completely all means for intertribal
cooperation. It became illegal for “more than ten native families or individual native labourers to
live on one plot.”249
The order “relating to native registration” required all Africans ages eight or older to
carry an identification card that was to be shown “to the police authorities or to any white man”
upon request.250 Food and lodging were unobtainable without this card. Travel permits were also
required, but granted only to those gainfully employment and traveling for work purposes. The
regulations on “service and labor contracts with natives” completed the Germans’ position of
dominance. They denied all legal rights to Africans without a labor contract. Africans could not
leave their place of residence while under contract and they could be dismissed on the grounds of
“repeated disobedience; incitement to disobedience; theft; desertion; lengthy incapacitation for
which the African was to blame; illness of more than four weeks.”251 During the allowed period
of illness, employers garnished wages to allow for decreased productivity. The regulations of
1906-1907 exacerbated the dire situation brought upon the Herero and other tribes during the
brutal suppression of the rebellion. The German administration denied them all means of selfsufficiency and destroyed any hope for legal security. The preceding regulations institutionalized
the practices of slave labor first introduced in the concentration camps. These practices continued
until the end of German rule in Southwest Africa.
In 1919, the German Colonial Office distributed a response to the British Blue Book of
1918, and its arguments vividly illustrated the extent to which the beliefs that had engendered
brutality against the Herero continued to permeate German colonialism in Southwest Africa far
into the twentieth century. The so-called “White Book” maintained views of native laziness,
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stating, “Of real work the Herero had no conception.”252 The Herero were still considered “poor,
primitive creatures who have no conception of the nature of an oath” and their actions were
considered to be motivated by “barbarous impulse.”253 The Blue Book had attacked legal
practices in Southwest Africa, and the “White Book” responded:
In those cases in which the courts of South-West Africa have uttered a more rigorous
sentence upon natives than whites, the reason is… in the fact that the character and
natural disposition of the natives conditioned severer disciplinary measures in order to
maintain law and order and protect the population against excesses. The natives of SouthWest Africa still stand upon a very low mental and moral plane.254
While the language of the White Book provided evidence of the continuation of raciallybased characterization of native Africans, it also attempted to recast some of the most widely
criticized aspects of colonialism in Southwest Africa to stem international opposition. It denied
the official issuance of the Extermination Order, claiming, “It is not unlikely that an order of this
sort, even thought not a formal [sic] order, may [author’s emphasis] have been temporarily issued
during the Herero war.”255 It then argued that most German detachments “simply and silently
refrained from carrying out the command of General von Trotha.”256 The account admitted to
certain instances of particularly vicious treatment, but colored them as exceptions to the general
character of German rule.257 Essentially, practices that were shown as widespread in a multitude
of other sources were deemed exceptions in the White Book. The language in this book served as
a tacit admission of German brutality and a confirmation of the belief system that supported it,
presented in a manner that sought to deny the worst excesses in order to cull favor in the
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international community and assist in Germany’s efforts to retain its colonies in the aftermath of
World War I:
It must be clear to every thinking judge of colonial-political questions that it was useless
to expect that such primitive savage tribes as the Hereros and most of the other aboriginal
breeds would make room for the requirements of modern commercial development
without being forced to do so by outward compulsion and regulative force.258
Comparisons
The appointment of the Ladies’ Commission was the most significant aspect of the
British government’s response to criticism, and ultimately represented a key difference between
the situations in South Africa and Southwest Africa. Although British colonial authorities had
previously allowed some degree of civilian involvement in and external observation of the camp
system (e.g., Emily Hobhouse), the Ladies’ Commission was something new altogether. It was
created by the Secretary of War and allowed virtually unfettered access to the camps while the
region was still embroiled in conflict. Even before publishing its findings, the existence of
commission had represented a degree of government submission to the criticisms levied by
Hobhouse and other activists. A commensurate situation was impossible in Southwest Africa.
German authorities had already made it abundantly clear that they were not willing to sacrifice
resources to care for imprisoned Africans when they could scarcely supply their own soldiers.
Missionaries were allowed to provide relief, but received no official support, such as supplies or
necessary personnel. In addition, the change to complete military control with the arrival of von
Trotha effectively ended opportunities for civilian oversight of the situation.
In addition to its political ramifications, the report of the Ladies’ Commission provided a
comprehensive, pragmatic account of the major problems in the camps (medicine, sanitation,
housing, etc.) and provided detailed potential solutions. The implementation of these solutions
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helped achieve a significant decrease in mortality. This situation points to another major
difference in the colonial power’s characterization of its enemy. Following the recall of the
Extermination Order, von Trotha – as well as his successor Lindequist – considered African
prisoners expendable tools, to be used up and discarded as cheap labor. The absence of a
commission comparable to the British one – even one comprised of officials within the military
apparatus – illustrates this point. Von Trotha’s military administration did not view prisoner
mortality as regrettable and was not pressured by the type of significant public and political
opposition that occurred in Britain, resulting in a lack of compulsion to document conditions in
the camps. A detailed report akin to that of the Ladies’ Commission would not only have been
beneficial to the prisoners, but also to the Germans themselves in terms of maintaining a reliable
labor force. Essentially, predominant views about the value of native Africans on the part of the
German colonial leadership dictated a position that did not consider reform in the camp system a
priority, even when it might provide better material prospects for the future of the colony.
Although the official policy of extermination was at an end, death continued to permeate
Southwest Africa to the detriment of both the colonized and the colonizer.
Ultimately, change did occur in both situations. In South Africa, it was a gradual process
that improved conditions in the system and employed strategies that attempted to transform the
Boers in the British image. Beginning in the waning stages of the war, the camp system became
geared toward “modernizing” Boer society. Education was a huge part of this effort. The Boers
were considered to be “redeemable,” but the manner of their redemption had to be carefully
orchestrated in order to buttress British authority in the region. The colonial administration
focused heavily on influencing the minds of young Boers, and through this effort strove to build
acceptance of British rule with Boer parents by showing tangible benefits in the form of
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educational opportunities for their children. Multiple accounts in The Times heralded increased
educational opportunities as the paramount contributing factor in securing good British-Boer
relations in the postwar period.259
Additionally, although many of the early reports from the camps derided Boers for
sanitary practices, authorities also engaged in efforts to instruct on proper hygiene and brought
Boer women into the fold as camp medical officers. In order to instruct these women, the home
government sought “‘ladies,’ exemplifying the values of the British middle class that Britain was
hoping to inculcate in its new colonial subjects.”260 In Southwest Africa, the establishment of the
camps themselves was the major shift that “improved” the situation of the colonized, if only by
the fact that they were no longer shot on sight. The camps were originally envisioned by von
Bülow as a temporary measure to house the remaining Herero after he fought for and achieved
the repeal of the Extermination Order. But the refusal of the authorities to provide adequate
support meant that the system was doomed to fail, and it rapidly lapsed into a continuation of the
previous policy.
In the end, the extent of “change” in German policy consisted of a shift from
extermination to enslavement, tied together by the belief that native Africans could occupy a
place in the renewed German colony, but only as a homogenous group of laborers (indeed, the
only role they were deemed fit to occupy). However, the colonial administration refused to
commit to providing the resources necessary to maintain this labor force and proceeded with a
strategy that essentially continued the annihilation. Additionally, official legal regulations in
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postwar German Southwest Africa deprived native Africans of any agency, rights, or control
over their own labor. It was possible, however, for opposition in Southwest Africa to occupy
roles that provided relief, such as in the case of Chancellor von Bülow (i.e., in his efforts to
rescind the Extermination Order) and the missionaries, or else the policy of outright
extermination would likely have existed until the Herero population was completely wiped out.
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CONCLUSIONS
It is undeniable that the sequences of events in South Africa and Southwest Africa shared
similarities from a high-level perspective. Both situations arose from the encroachment of
colonial powers into regions with existing populations that were resistant to measures that
threatened their land and rights, and that ultimately felt compelled to respond by means of force.
At a certain point in each conflict, both colonial powers deemed it necessary to invocate tactics
that targeted noncombatants, culminating in the use of concentration camps, and in neither case
were these tactics completely free from scrutiny. Variations in the manner in which civilianfocused tactics were implemented, the core beliefs that supported these tactics, and the level of
public and political opposition and its tangible effects, however, clearly emerge as
representations of the two country’s markedly different views of their enemies.
The initial adoption of civilian-focused measures by the British in South Africa was
represented by scorched earth. This policy exemplified a view that the Boers should be held to
the same standard of military conduct as the British. There was a general expression of anger that
a civilized nation had resorted to the use of uncivilized, dishonorable tactics. Scorched earth
entailed extensive property destruction and the displacement of Boer families, but its intent was
not outright extermination. The policy was loosely managed, making it subject to excesses that
often resulted in the indiscriminate burning of farms, but its core intention was presented as a
desire to eradicate the material and informational support supposedly being provided to Boer
commandos by the farms’ inhabitants. Civilian-focused measures in Southwest Africa, however,
were a focus of German military policy once the Herero rebellion began, and were consistently
backed by a philosophy that derided the audacity of an “inferior” people to rise in revolt against
their colonial superiors. When German forces failed to achieve a quick, decisive victory, they
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used tactics that went far beyond removing sources of support for African combatants, instead
choosing a course that sought annihilation. This course did not only strive to end the Herero’s
capability to continue resistance, but also expressed a larger desire for the complete removal of
their presence in Southwest Africa.
The concentration camps in South Africa suffered from a lack of proper planning and a
shortage of resources, which resulted in high mortality rates and dismal living conditions for
camp inmates during their initial period of operation. British authorities considered the camps to
serve a temporary purpose, and did not foresee the amount of support necessary to allow them to
function effectively as their populations steadily increased. This represented, however, profound
ignorance, not malicious intent. The creation of concentration camps in Southwest Africa,
conversely, continued the previous work of extermination through different means. German
authorities committed no meaningful resources to these camps, and the inmates were considered
a commodity to be used for slave labor.
In both cases, opposition to the conduct of the colonial powers arose in the public and
political spheres. In Britain, this opposition developed into a powerful sequence of cause and
effect that inspired governmental action and led to meaningful change, while in Germany, it
consisted mainly of punctuated instances of resistance that led to policy adjustments, but
ultimately failed provide significant relief for the Herero. Liberal politicians in Britain pressed
for information on conditions in the camps early in their existence, and were provided with
significant evidence to challenge the government when Emily Hobhouse’s report was published.
Foreign opposition became widespread as the public exposure of camp conditions grew, which
inspired concerns in Parliament and the press regarding Britain’s international prestige.
Supporters of the camps became defensive and hinged their responses on justifications for the
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creation of the policy itself, but the mounting evidence of the mortality rates and living
conditions created a situation in which they were essentially forced to commit to further
investigation of the situation. Criticism of the Herero camps did not share this type of
incremental development. Activism in the colony itself was limited to a singular group, the
Rhenish Mission, and this group’s desire to retain autonomy from political concerns kept it from
engaging in public campaigning. The report of Dr. Fuchs presented a dismal account of camp
conditions, but the structure of the administration in Southwest Africa kept it from inspiring
meaningful change – it lost any potential effect when it was ignored by his superiors. Chancellor
von Bülow achieved the most significant reform when he maneuvered to force von Trotha’s hand
and have the Extermination Order repealed. The retention of von Trotha as the ultimate power in
the colony, however, meant that subsequent measures (i.e., the concentration camps) would not
proceed in the spirit of reform suggested by the decision to repeal the order. Authority still rested
with von Trotha, and the camps essentially continued his previous policies.
The existence of an official government response to criticism was a key divergence
between these two cases. Following the growth of public and political criticism, British
authorities were compelled to officially evaluate the conditions. Even if the hope of the Ladies’
Commission was that its findings would disprove Hobhouse’s report and the claims made in
Parliament, it existed as an admission that the issue of camp conditions was significant enough to
require official investigation. Unlike Dr. Fuchs’s report, it was not ignored or suppressed when it
was clear it represented a dire situation, but was disseminated and used as evidence by politicians
to argue for further change. Authorities acted on its suggestions and significantly improved
conditions in the camps. German authorities were not compelled to similar action by critical
forces, and their policies, even after the departure of von Trotha, continued to embody previous
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views regarding the place of Africans in German colonial society. Official regulations legally
established their subservient position and divested them of any remaining property and rights.
The camp system continued its brutality unabated and grew in scope as native Africans were
increasingly sent out as disposable labor for private enterprise.
Ultimately, change in the treatment of the Boers by the British proceeded with a constant
theme that the future prosperity of the region, even under British colonial control, would entail
effective co-existence. The camps were increasingly seen as “sowing the seeds of discontent,”
and reform must occur to ensure the effective functioning of the colony following the war.261
Even Joseph Chamberlain, who strongly supported the war, scorched earth, and the
establishment of the concentration camp system, stated in Parliament: “We have… expressed our
hope, our intention, our expectation, as soon as possible to grant to the people whom we have
conquered full political rights, and meanwhile, we have promised them that from the first they
shall have equal justice and equal privileges.”262 The Boers were seen as valuable contributors,
exemplified by the commitment to education, both in the camp schools and with regard to
medicine. Certainly, reform efforts emphasized modernizing Boer society in the British image
and strove to inculcate British values, but the Boers were considered “redeemable” – their
decision to revolt did not entail their removal. In Southwest Africa, the possibility for coexistence only existed in the formative years of the colony during the governorship of Theodor
Leutwein. He sought to use tribal leaders to his advantage and keep them in power in order to
create a balance that would be beneficial to the colony’s prospects. His tactics focused on the
retention of certain elements of native society. The belief that concessions were being made to
the supposed “savages” sparked massive resistance from those that had the most daily interaction
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with the Herero (i.e., the German settlers), and created a situation which inspired revolt. The
conciliatory stance was replaced with one of brutal subjugation (with the appointment of von
Trotha), and native intransigence became a justification for violent action and extermination.
Native Africans were never again considered to occupy a meaningful place in the colonial
society, and their only value was considered to be their role as expendable slave labor.
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This thesis investigates the use of noncombatant-focused tactics by European colonial
powers through the comparison of two specific instances of colonial conflict in southern Africa
at the turn of the twentieth century: the Anglo-Boer War in South Africa and the series of
conflicts commonly referred to as the Herero Wars in German Southwest Africa. It maintains
that the propensity for meaningful shifts in the treatment of noncombatants depended greatly on
the nature of the victims (i.e., whites of European descent, as opposed to native Africans) and the
prevailing viewpoints on their roles in the respective colonial societies. Moreover, it argues that
policy change was dictated mainly by differences in the presence, character, and effect of
opposition in the public and political spheres and the structure of the administration within the
colony carrying out the policy.
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